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This dissertation addresses the value of shipwrecks, the reasons why persons have an interest in 
shipwrecks, the nature of competing claims for the shipwrecks by different persons and how 
different national laws and international law, treaties and conventions attempts to resolve such 
competing claims and the difficulties arising therefrom and possible olutions to eliminate such 
difficulties. 
The ocean covers 71 per cent of the Earth's surface and contains 97 per cent of the planet's 
water, yet more than 95 per cent of the underwater world remains unexplored.1 These waters have 
separated but also connected civilizations over thousands of years and have been the carrier of 
many human adventures.2 As civilizations grew more advanced humans began to explore the vast 
oceans. In 1488 Portuguese explorer Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope at the 
southern tip of Africa, establishing the possibility of a sea route to the Far East.3 In 1492, 
Columbus's voyage to the New World is regarded as the moment of birh or westward exploration.4 
Bristol merchants first probed the Atlantic in 1480 in search of an island they called Brasile and 
they continued to send two or three ships west every year.5 During such expeditions, over centuries, 
with population explosions, and the use of the sea for the transportation of both goods and people, 
not to mention wars and sea battles, ships have sunk all around the world. The United Nations 
estimates that there are over 3 million shipwrecks on the sea floor.6
 With the technological advances every year researchers and salvors have been more able to 
investigate deeper into the unknown ocean floor resulting in shipwrecks being discovered more 
frequently. Moreover, the creation of treasure-hunting companies such as Odyssey, who define 
themselves as world leaders in deep-ocean shipwreck exploration,7 has also resulted in the increase 
in discovery of shipwrecks.  
 When one thinks of a shipwreck lost deep underwater, it is easy to think of it as a total loss, 
however this is not the case. Depending on environmental conditions, many shipwrecks have been 
                                                 
1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Uited States Department of Commerce available at 
http://www.noaa.gov/ocean.html, last accessed on 15/01/2014 
2 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/the-underwater-heritage/wrecks/, last 
accessed on 15/01/2014 
3 Professor Callum Roberts, ‘The Unnatural History of the Sea’ (2009), page 33 
4 Professor Callum Roberts, ‘The Unnatural History of the Sea’(2009), page 33 
5 Professor Callum Roberts, ‘The Unnatural History of the Sea’ (2009), page 33 
6 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 
Wrecks available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/the-underwater-
heritage/wrecks/, last accessed on 15/01/2014 
7 Odyssey Marine Exploration, Company Overview available at http://www.shipwreck.net/aboutus.php, last accessed on 
27/01/2014 
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preserved underwater for thousands of years. Shipwrecks may, therefore, be valuable in various 
ways. 
 A shipwreck may be of value commercially. Throughout time ships have been used to 
transport valuable cargo. For example, the SS Gairsoppa that was sunk by a German U-boat in 1941 
was carrying a total cargo of silver worth £600 000 at the time; the SS Montola which sank as a 
result of a torpedo from a German submarine was carrying a cargo of silver worth £110 000; and the 
Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes was a Spanish warship that was sunk by a British frigate that was 
carrying nearly 600,000 gold and silver coins.8  
 A shipwreck may also provide precious historical information. A shipwreck by its very 
nature is testimony to trade and cultural dialogue between peoples. Moreover, the unique 
underwater environment created by the pressure and constant water temperature creates a time 
capsule preserving the wreck which can often provide a snapshot of the life on board at the time of 
sinking. States, and the communities within them, would consider many shipwrecks and their cargo 
to be part of their cultural heritage.  
 Furthermore, many shipwrecks, such as the SS Gairsoppa and SS Montola, were military 
vessels and may contain sensitive information or be considered grave sites for the persons that 
served and died on board.  
 As a result of a shipwreck possessing such values, when a shipwreck is discovered 
competing interests arise between various parties that may claim an interest for differing reasons. It 
has been described as a ‘tug of war for the spoils with the usual contestants being the salvors, the 
original owners or their successors and national or State governments and their allies, the historic 
preservationists.’9 The recent cases of The Titanic and The Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes have 
highlighted the many complex legal issues that arise as a re ult of these competing interests. These 
cases have also highlighted the inconsistency, lack of clarity and perhaps inadequacy of the current 
legislation dealing with the discovery of shipwrecks in international waters.  This dissertation seeks 
to address those issues. 
Competing interests usually involve three different scenarios. In the first scenario, a salvor 
attempts to assert rights over a shipwreck in competition with the original private owners. This 
generally involves the application of the law of salvage or the law of finds to determine private 
property rights.  
In the second scenario, a salvor attempts to assert ownership rights over a shipwreck in 
competition with the claims of the original flag-State owners. In this scenario, the salvor will still 
                                                 
8 Odyssey Marine Exploration, Shipwrecks available at http://www.shipwreck.net/shipwrecks.php last accessed on 
15/01/2014 
9 Elizabeth Varmer, ‘RMS Titanic: underwater cultural heritage's sacrifice’, Journal of Business Law 271 (2012),  page 
276 
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claim ownership, or claim a salvage award, under the law of finds or salvage but such claims may 
compete with the claims made by the Sovereign State which may rely on sovereign immunity.  
 In the third scenario, a salvor attempts to assert rights over a shipwreck in competition 
directly with the flag-State, and the State or people of cultural o igin. Recent international 
developments in this area of law show that when dealing with shipwrecks, its economic value 
should be superseded by other more important considerations, such as the protection of underwater 
cultural heritage.  International conventions and the growing recogniti n of the importance of 
underwater cultural heritage has had the effect of diluting and lessening the importance of legal 
doctrines such as law of salvage and the law of finds, as well as a flag-State's ability to claim 
sovereign immunity.  
 This dissertation outlines the main legal issues relating to each scenario using England, 
South Africa and the United States of America as examples, because these are States have important 
interests in shipping and therefore, have more developed laws which apply to the resolution of 
claims over shipwrecks. Key cases referred to illustrate the complexities involved and highlight 
areas of common ground and differences in the way that the courts of those States have dealt with 
parties’ rights to shipwrecks. The law and cases show that there ar  important differences in the 
manner that rights are recognised depending on location of the wrecks and the jurisdiction which 
determines the rights over the wreck. This serves to emphasise the n ed for a more comprehensive 
and clearer set of rules that takes into account the interests of all c mpeting parties and of uniform 
application throughout the world. This can be achieved through an international convention or in 
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CHAPTER 2 
COURT JURISDICTION ON WRECKS 
 
2(i) –Jurisdiction over shipwrecks located in international waters 
 
The first issue that a finder of a wreck, or salvor, will face when attempting to assert rights over a 
shipwreck will be the issue of jurisdiction. The concept of jurisdiction has been described as 'the 
power of a court to hear and decide an issue between parties and to give effect to its judgement.'10 
The issue of jurisdiction is more complicated if the shipwreck is located in international waters as 
the wreck will not by reason of its situ, be subject to any one State's jurisdiction. A classical view on 
the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas was given in 1817 by an English Admiralty Judge who 
declared that ‘in places where no local authority exists, where t subjects of all States meet upon a 
footing of entire equality and independence, no one State, or any of its subjects, has a right to 
assume or exercise authority over the subjects of another. No nation can exercise a right of 
visitation and search upon the common and unappropriated parts of the sea save only on the 
belligerent claim.’11 
International law now determines the jurisdiction, and thus control, that a State can exercise 
over property found in international bodies of water. The sources of such admiralty jurisdiction can 
be found in statutes, Conventions, rules of court and judicial doctrines.12 Conventions in particular 
play a major role in the expansion or restriction of admiralty jurisdiction of States. Moreover, the 
ratification of international conventions means that the internal municipal laws of different 
countries now show greater similarity to one another. 
The principal international convention governing jurisdiction of the sea is the United 
Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). UNCLOS, as well as seeking to 
clarify the definition, nature and extent of international jurisdiction in the territorial sea (defined 
below) and contiguous zones, has created new maritime zones such as the continental shelf, the 
exclusive economic zone and archipelagic waters. This dissertation will mainly be looking at 
shipwrecks that are found in the high seas (defined below); however, cas s involving shipwrecks 
within territorial waters, and other maritime zones, where jurisdiction is not contested, will also be 
discussed, to illustrate the courts approach to the determination of rights in a shipwreck. Water 
within 12 nautical miles of a State's shorelines is considered within the territory of that State and the 
sovereignty of each coastal State over its territorial sea ‘i  exercised subject to UCNLOS and to 
                                                 
10 Gys Hofmeyr, ‘Admiralty Jurisdiction: Law and Practice in South Africa’  2 Ed (2009),  page 20 
11 The Louis 2 Dodson’s Reports (1817) 219, 243-244, per Sir William Scott, later Lord Stowell 
12 Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 2 Ed (2009), CH 1,  page 8 
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other rules of international law’.13 Beyond the internal waters of a State, the territorial sea and the 
EEZ is an area of water termed the ‘high seas’ that no State h s control over.14 By customary 
international law the freedom of navigation on the high seas is absolute, subject to exceptions.15 
Article 89 UNCLOS provides that ‘no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas 
to its sovereignty’. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the powers that States 
possess over each maritime zone; however it is important to appreciate that a salvor must be able to 
bring the claim relating to the shipwreck within a State's jurisdiction to be able to assert rights over 
it. 
Admiralty Jurisdiction is achieved in various ways in different jurisdictions. In England, for 
example, the present statute dealing with jurisdiction is the Supreme Court Act 1981 (SCA) and the 
rules of court for admiralty procedures in Part 61 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR), as 
amended, and new Practice Directions. In South Africa the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Court 
is governed by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 (AJRA). In the US Article 
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution grants original jurisdiction to US federal courts over 
admiralty and maritime matters. 
 These jurisdictions are unique due to the existence of actions in rem which can be described 
as actions in regard to rights over property within a State's territory. As mentioned above, States 
only have in rem jurisdiction over the property situated within their territory, thus in rem actions can 
only affect property within jurisdiction of the court. This necessarily complicates the resolution of 
claims in respect of shipwrecks that are located in international waters and not within any particular 
State's jurisdiction.  
 While ships located in the high seas are not within any one State’s jurisdiction, there are 
legal mechanisms for courts to obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate clims relating to them. One of such 
mechanisms that have been developed is called 'constructive in rem jurisdiction'.  
 This problem can be overcome by physically removing and taking part of the property (i.e. 
the shipwreck) to the court giving the court constructive possession. Constructive possession does 
not actually require the court to be in physical possession of all the property. It is based on a legal 
fiction that ‘the res is not divided and that therefore possession of some of it is constructively 
possession of all’.16 It is important to note that although the court becomes in constructive 
possession of the property, the action that is under a constructive in rem jurisdiction is not exclusive 
                                                 
13 Article 2(3) United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea 
14Article 3 Part II ‘Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone’; Article 86  Part VII ‘High Seas’ United Nations Convention on 
the Laws of the Sea 
15 I.A. Shearer, ‘Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement against Delinquent Vessels’ International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1986), page 9 
16RMS Titanic Inc v Haver 171 F. 3d 943 (1999) (4th Circuit) USA, at 952 - 953 
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jurisdiction as any other State would have the same power to issue the same order.17 The court 
would therefore be able to issue declarations and orders in relation to the property but final 
enforcement would be ineffective until the whole or part of the res is brought before the court.  
 This mechanism has been used in two recent important cases involving shipwrecks located 
in international waters, namely the Titanic18 and the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes19. I will deal 
with each one in turn.  
 
2(ii) – The Titanic 
The Titanic was a British owned steamer that sank in international waters of the Atlantic Ocean. She 
was left to rest for 73 years before being discovered by a joint American and French expedition in 
1985 and is now known to be located in international waters around 400 miles off the coast of 
Canada, around 12 500 feet deep. 
 In this case no court could be said to have jurisdiction over the shipwreck because it is not 
within any State's territory. Thus, for the court to be able to exercise jurisdiction over the Titanic 
they had to find constructive possession. In 1993, RMST, the then salvors, asked the Eastern 
District of Virginia to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the Titanic. RMST brought a wine decanter 
along with other objects from the shipwreck within the territory of Virginia to assist the court in 
obtaining jurisdiction. The court decided that ‘when property is outside of the State a court's ability 
to adjudicate right as to them is limited, but not meaningless. The court can adjudicate the claim, 
ensure enforcement within its State and hope that it will be enforced elsewhere.’20 
 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found that it had constructive in rem jurisdiction over the 
wreck when any portion of the Titanic was within its jurisdiction and the salvor was able to 
continue with its salvaging operations. The expression of hope by the Court in this case as to the 
orders being enforced elsewhere, however, emphasises the limits of the jurisdiction exercised and 
risks over its recognition outside that jurisdiction. 
 
2(iii) – The Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes 
In May 2007, Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc. (Odyssey), a leading enterprise in the field of deep 
ocean explorations,21 announced the discovery of a shipwreck of a Spanish frigate, the Nuestra 
Senora de las Mercedes, which sunk in 1804 by the British fleet some 100 miles west of the Straits 
                                                 
17 RMS Titanic Inc v Haver 171 F. 3d 943 (1999) (4th Circuit) USA, 969 
18 RMS Titanic Inc v Haver 171 F. 3d 943 (1999) (4th Circuit) USA 
19 Odyssey Marine Exploration inc. v The Unidentified Shipwreck Vessel and the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of 
Peru, US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, 3 June 2009; Case no. 8:07-CV-614-SDM-
MAP 
20 RMS Titanic Inc v Haver 171 F. 3d 943 (1999) (4th Circuit) USA, 969 
21 Odyssey Marine Exploration, About Us available at http://www.shipwreck.net/aboutus.php, last accessed on 
06/02/2014 
11 | P a g e 
 
of Gibraltar.22 Again, similarly to the case of the Titanic, Odyssey brought some salvaged items 
from the frigate to the United States and filed an admiralty arrest action by symbolically depositing 
a small bronze block with the District Court. Following the commencement of the action by 
Odyssey, the States of Spain and Peru along with various descendants of people who had died 
aboard the ship also filed claims in the case. The court found that the salvaged items had been taken 
from a sovereign Spanish ship and was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus could not be 
arrested. Although the court eventually refused jurisdiction on the grounds of sovereign immunity it 
is nevertheless important to note that the lower courts had exercised jurisdiction over the shipwreck 
prior to the argument of sovereign immunity being raised. The significa ce of the case was that, as 
in the case of the Titanic, the courts were able to have constructive in rem jurisdiction over the 
wreck that was located in international waters, at least for the purposes of deciding whether or not 





















                                                 
22 Odyssey Marine Exploration inc. v The Unidentified Shipwreck Vessel and the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of 
Peru, US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, 3 June 2009; Case no. 8:07-CV-614-SDM-
MAP 
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CHAPTER 3 
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS (LAW OF SALVAGE v LAW OF FINDS) 
 
Once jurisdiction has been established in a particular court, it is likely that legal rights will be 
contested between various parties claiming an interest in the shipwreck. The salvors must expect to 
compete in a ‘tug of war for the spoils; [with] the usual contestant  [being] (1) the salvors; (2) the 
original owners or their successors; and (3) national or State gov rnments and their allies, the 
historic preservationists.’23 There are numerous views on the appropriate rule to apply to 
shipwrecks. Once such view explained that there were three main options: 
 
‘(1) the salvage rule that the salvor does not create any ownership rig ts in the property 
saved: (2) the finders principle, informally expressed as 'finders keepers, losers weepers,' at least in 
the case of abandoned property; or (3) the international law principle that property of historical and 
archaeological importance should be preserved for the benefit of mankind as a whole.’24 
 
The following chapter will discuss and outline the law of salvage nd the law of finds, their 
application to shipwrecks and whether they are an adequate regime to apply. Because of the fact 
specific nature of shipwrecks it is important to look at how the law of salvage and finds have been 
applied in different jurisdictions in relation to different fact patterns. Consequently, this chapter will 
look at both regimes and their application to shipwrecks in the predominant maritime jurisdictions 
with particular focus on the United States of America, England and Wales and South Africa. 
 
3(i) - SALVAGE 
Salvage has been defined as ‘any act or activity undertaken to assist  vessel or any other property 
in danger in navigable waters, or in any other waters whatsoever.’25 If a claimant is successful in 
claiming salvage they will be rewarded for their efforts. The first part of this chapter will first look 
at the origins of salvage law followed by the application of the law of salvage in the jurisdictions of 
England, South Africa and the US. 
 
3(i)(a) - Origins of salvage law 
Our present-day admiralty law originate from maritime practices from nearly five thousand years 
                                                 
23 Thomas Schoenbaum, ‘Admiralty and Maritime Law’ (2011), Chapter 16-7 
24 Thomas Schoenbaum, ‘Admiralty and Maritime Law’ (2011), Chapter 16-7 
25 Article 1(a) International Convention on Salvage 1989 
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ago in the Mediterranean Sea.26 The first recorded system of marine law was created and 
promulgated by the Rhodians around year 300 BC.27 From this Rhodian maritime code emerged the 
beginnings of the law of salvage where a salvor was awarded a portion of the goods he saved based 
on the danger involved in the rescue.28 
 The Romans subsequently modified Rhodian law by providing a right of compensation from 
the owner of the salvaged property rather than a portion of the cargo s ved. This Roman rule of 
salvage was further developed and elaborated upon by the Laws of Oleron in the twelfth century 
AD, the precursor to English maritime law.29 
 The principles of salvage were continually refined and developed by judges of the Admiralty 
Court in England. But it was not until 1910 that these principles were unifi d by the first salvage 
Convention to apply internationally.30 
 The salvors right to an award arises from the fact that salvage is a mixed question of a 
private right and public policy. The purpose of salvage is not only to compensate the salvor for the 
benefit he has conferred to the salved property, it is also provides an incentive to seafarers to take 
risks for the purpose of assisting others in danger.31 
 The question that must be asked is whether the law of salvage is applicable to shipwrecks 
resulting in a salvor being entitled to a salvage award for the salvage operation. This question has 
been answered differently in different jurisdictions. 
 
3(i)(b) – Law of Salvage in England and Wales 
Salvage law in the England and Wales32 i  based on the 1989 Salvage Convention (the Convention) 
which came into force internationally in 1996 and was enacted into English law by Schedule 11 to 
the MSA 1995.33 
 Article 1(a) defines that, for the purpose of the Convention, a salvage operation means any 
act or activity undertaken to assist a vessel or any other property in danger in navigable waters, or in 
any other waters whatsoever.34 Article 2 of the Convention provides that the Convention shall apply 
                                                 
26 Daniel P. Larsen, ‘Ownership of Historic Shipwreck in US Law’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, Vol 9, No 1 (1994) 
27 Daniel P. Larsen, ‘Ownership of Historic Shipwreck in US Law’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, Vol 9, No 1 (1994), page 32 
28 Daniel P. Larsen, ‘Ownership of Historic Shipwreck in US Law’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, Vol 9, No 1 (1994), page 32 
29 Daniel P. Larsen, ‘Ownership of Historic Shipwreck in US Law’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, Vol 9, No 1 (1994), page 32 
30 Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 2 Ed (2009), CH 13,  page 634 
31 Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 2 Ed (2009), CH 13,  page 634 
32 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discus  all the elements of salvage in full detail; however, relevant 
elements of salvage in relation to shipwrecks will be discussed. 
33 Schedule 11 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (United Kingdom) 
34 The UK has made a reservation, pursuant to Article 30 of the Convention, under Paragraph 2(1) Part II of Schedule 11 
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whenever judicial or arbitral proceedings relating to matters dealt with in this Convention are 
brought in a State party. Article 6(1) provides that the Convention shallapp y to any salvage 
operations save to the extent that a contract otherwise provides expressly, or by implication. 
 There is an exception with regard to salvage operations controlled by public authorities. 
Article 5 provides that this Convention shall not affect any provisins of national law or any 
international convention relating to salvage operations by or under the control of public authorities. 
Additionally, subject to Article 5, Article 4 provides that the Convention shall not apply to warships 
or other non-commercial State-owned vessels, unless a State party decides to apply the Convention 
to warships. 
 The question is whether the law of salvage in England and Wales can be pplied to the 
salvage of a shipwreck. For the law of salvage to apply to shipwrecks, all the elements of salvage 
must be satisfied, namely: (i) there should be a recognised subject matter; (ii) the object of salvage 
should be in danger at sea; (iii) the salvors must be volunteers; and (iv) there must be success by 
either preserving or contributing to preserving the property in danger.35 The main issues that have 
arisen in relation to the application of the law of salvage to shipwreck are; (1) whether a shipwreck 
is a recognised subject of salvage; and (2) whether a shipwreck can satisfy the requirement that it be 
in danger. Each will be dealt with in turn. 
 
3(i)(b)(1) - Recognised subject of salvage in England & Wales 
The first problem that arises when attempting to apply the law of salvage to a shipwreck is 
determining whether a shipwreck falls within the definition of propety that is recognised subject of 
salvage. Maritime law has traditionally recognised that property such as ship or craft, cargo on 
board, freight payable pursuant to the contract of carriage, and bunkers carried on board the ship be 
property that is capable of being subject to salvage.36 The concept of property has been expanded by 
the Convention, for example, the Convention also recognises saving life as an independent subject 
of salvage, regardless of whether or not the life salvors saved the property in danger.37 The 
Convention also recognises as subject of salvage the protection of the marine environment.  
 To determine whether a ‘shipwreck’ is capable of being a ‘ship’ for the purposes of the law 
of salvage, the concept of a ‘ship’ must first be defined. Section 313(1) of the MSA 1995 defines 
'ship' as including every description of vessel used in navigation.  A vessel used in navigation is 
confined to a vessel which is used to make ordered progression over the water from one place to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
to the MSA 1995 that Salvage does not apply to inland waters. 
35 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discus  all elements of salvage law. For a more detailed study on the law 
of salvage in England see Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 2 Ed (2009) 
Chapter 13 
36 Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 2 Ed (2009), CH 13, page 643 
37 Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 2 Ed (2009), CH 13, page 643 
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another, although it is not a necessary requirement that it should be sed in transporting persons or 
property by water to an intended destination.38 Crafts that are used for having fun without the object 
of going anywhere, such as jet skis, are not 'used in navigation' and are, accordingly, excluded from 
the definition of 'ship or vessel'.39 Article 1(a) of the Convention defines 'salvage operations' as 
including services rendered to vessels, or to any other property in danger. Article 1(b) defines a 
vessel as meaning 'any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation'.  
 Having defined the concept of a ‘ship’ the question of whether a sunken ship, or shipwreck, 
falls within the definition of a ‘ship’ or ‘property capable of being the subject of salvage’ can now 
be dealt with. Section 255(1) MSA 1995 defines a wreck as including 'jetsam, flotsam, lagan and 
derelict found in or on the shores of the sea or any tidal water.' Although a wreck still may be 
considered a ship, it will no longer be capable of navigation meaning that it cannot fall within the 
definition in Article 1(b) of the Convention. Perhaps if the court were to take into account its 
original use of being used in navigation prior to becoming a wreck, a shipwreck could be 
considered a ship 'capable of navigation’; however there is no precedent where the courts have done 
so.  
 If a wreck is found not to be a ship for the purposes of Article 1(b), it has been submitted 
that a wreck will fall within the definition of 'property' in Article 1(c) as 'not permanently and 
intentionally attached to the shoreline', and thus will be capable of being subject of salvage.40 
 Moreover, a wreck which contains treasures may be a subject of salvage, provided there is 
no reservation made by contracting States as to archaeological finds, as is allowed by Article 
30(1)(d) of the Convention. 
 It is therefore unclear whether the English courts would find that a shipwreck is capable of 
being property subject to salvage. This emphasises the need for universal cla ification on whether 
shipwrecks are to be considered property subject to salvage. 
 
3(i)(b)(2) - The Danger Element in England & Wales 
The second difficulty with applying salvage law to shipwrecks is the requirement that the object of 
salvage must be in peril or danger at sea. The general principle of salvage is that there must be some 
real danger, which is likely to expose the property to destruction or damage.41 An apprehension of 
danger is sufficient, but it must not be a fanciful danger. Dr. Lushington has been of the opinion that 
                                                 
38 R v Goodwin [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep 432 
39 R v Goodwin [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep 432; Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 
2 Ed (2009), CH 13, page 644 
40 Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 2 Ed (2009), CH 13, page 645 
41 Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management’, 2 Ed (2009), CH 13, page 647 
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'it is sufficient if there is a state of difficulty, and reasonable apprehension [of danger].'42 In the case 
of The Charlotte Dr. Lushington again stated that 'it is not necessary... that the distress should be 
actual or immediate, or that the danger should be imminent and absolute, it will be sufficient if, at 
the time the assistance is rendered, the ship has encountered any damage or misfortune which might 
possibly expose her to destruction if the services were not rendered.'43 
 There are different views with regards to whether a shipwreck is still in peril as the ship has 
already sunk and the salvor is not preventing it from doing so. Some claim that the wreck and its 
contents are still in peril from the sea and could become lost or damaged while others claim the 
peril has passed.44 
‘The concept of marine peril is stretched to its limit in the treasure salvage cases, where an 
ancient wreck has lain undisturbed on or in submerged lands for hundreds of years or more. 
Even here, some courts considering the issue hold that a marine peril xists because the 
vessel is still in peril of being lost though the action of the elements.’45 
The courts in England and Wales have taken the view that a shipwreck is no longer in peril 
and thus do not apply the law of salvage to shipwrecks.46 A  a result, a salvage award would not 
seem like an option for treasure hunting ventures in the jurisdiction of England. 
 
3(i)(c) – Law of Salvage in South Africa 
We will now consider the position of shipwrecks in relation to the law of salvage in South Africa. 
The South African coastline is a long and dangerous coastline where many ships have 
unsuccessfully attempted to circumnavigate Africa in their quest for the riches of the East.47 The 
Cape of Good Hope and Cape Agulhas have been notorious among mariners around the world 
where harsh weather has caused many spectacular feats of salvage.48  
Present South African salvage law is seen as being a balance between traditional salvage law 
inherited from England, and the broadly accepted principles of the International Convention on 
Salvage 198949 (the Salvage Convention). The law of salvage in South Africa is enshrined in the 
Wreck & Salvage Act.50 Given the fact that South African Salvage law is also based on the Salvage 
Convention, the question of whether salvage law can be applied to shipwrecks ill al o depend on 
                                                 
42 The Phantom [1866] LR 1 A&E 58, p 60, per Dr Lushington. 
43 The Charlotte (1848) 3 W Rob 68, p 71. 
44 Elizabeth Varner, ‘RMS Titanic: underwater cultural heritage's sacrifice’, Journal of Business Law 271 (2012), page 
11 
45 Thomas Schoenbaum, ‘Admiralty and Maritime Law’ (2011), 16-7 
46 Pierce v Bemis [1986] 2 WLR 501, [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep 132 
47 John Hare, ‘Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa’, 2 Ed (2009), page 396 
48 John Hare, ‘Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa’, 2 Ed (2009), page 396 
49 The International Convention on Salvage 1989 (IMO) 
50 Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996 (South Africa) 
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two important questions; firstly, whether a shipwreck is considered as maritime property capable of 
being salved; and secondly, whether a shipwreck can be considered to be in danger. 
 
3(i)(c)(1) – Recognised subject of salvage in South Africa 
Traditionally, prior to the Salvage Convention, maritime property for the purposes of salvage 
included a ‘ship (if used as a ship, her cargo, flotsam, lagan and jetsam, the wreck of each), and 
freight.’51 Traditionally it would seem clear that a shipwreck would be considered maritime 
property that is capable of being salved. Article 1 of the Salvage Convention has expanded the 
traditional definition of maritime property considerably providing that a ‘salvage operation means 
any act or activity undertaken to assist a vessel or any other property in navigable waters or in any 
other waters whatsoever.’ Property is then defined as meaning ‘any property not permanently and 
intentionally attached to the shoreline and includes freight at risk.’ It therefore seems clearer in 
South Africa that a shipwreck be considered property that is recognised subject of salvage. 
 
3(i)(c)(2) – The Danger Element in South Africa 
Under South African law, without an element of danger, there can be o salvage service. The 
question is also whether a shipwreck can be considered to be in ‘danger’ or ‘peril’ to satisfy the 
requirements of salvage. 
The traditional definition of danger is based on English law pursuant to section 6 of the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 1983 (AJRA), namely that the danger must have been real52 
and sensible. For example, in The Marie Jose53 a vessel was considered to be in danger where it was 
in imminent danger of running aground and was provided with an anchor by a salvor. I have already 
set out Dr. Lushington’s analysis of ‘danger’ in ‘II.I.B.2 – The Danger Element in the England and 
Wales’ above, which is applicable in South Africa. 
The prerequisite of the salved property being in danger is now governed by Article 1 of the 
Salvage Convention; however, in the absence of any definition of ‘danger’, th  courts will still look 
at the common law for guidance. The definition of ‘danger’ should therefor  be unaltered by the 
Salvage Convention.54  
The debate as to whether a shipwreck is considered to be in danger for the purposes of 
salvage also exists in South Africa and the result is that case law seems to suggest that salvage law 
is not applied to shipwrecks. 
                                                 
51 The Gasfloat Whitton No 2 [1895] P 308; R v Two Casks of Tallow (1837) 3 Hag Adm 294; Five Steel Barges (1890) 
15 PD 142; A Raft of Timber (1844) 2 W. Rob 251 
52 The Blairhoyle: Randall v Gray (1895) 12 SC 387; The Papanui: Table Bay Harbour Board v New Zealand 
Steamship Co (1901) 18 SC 34 
53 The Marie Jose: Mossel Bay Boating Co v Brink (1901) 18 SC 271 
54 John Hare, ‘Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa’, 2 Ed (2009), page 416. 
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3(i)(c)(3) – Application of salvage law to shipwrecks in South Africa 
Presuming a shipwreck is considered to be ‘maritime property’ and a shipwreck is considered to be 
in ‘danger’, and all the other elements of salvage are satisfied, a salvor of a shipwreck in South 
Africa should be awarded with a salvage award for his efforts. As we will see below, South African 
courts have been reluctant to apply the law of salvage to shipwrecks.  
 In Mills v Reck55 although the courts dealt with the issue of ownership in saying that ‘neither 
the original salvor nor the intervening person has a right of ownership, but where there is 
competition between the original salvor and an intervening person for possession, the original 
salvor has a preferent right’, the possibility of applying for a salvage award was not expressly 
excluded. The fact that the applicant was ‘a professional diver and in possession of a licence to 
salvage, to search and take possession of derelict ships or parts thereof’ would suggest that the idea 
of salvage of a wreck would in fact be possible.56 Moreover in the case of Salvage Association of 
London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd57where the court found that insurers had not abandoned their 
rights of ownership of the wreck, the court did not exclude the possibility of a salvage award and in 
fact suggested that ‘it may be possible that some arrangement igh be made whereby the 
respondents should continue the operations on the basis of a percentage of the treasure recovered.’58 
 To date, however, there is no case law in South Africa in which the court has awarded a 
salvor with a salvage award for the salvage of a shipwreck. 
 
3(i)(d) – Law of Salvage in the United States of America 
The position in the US is clearer without the difficulties that arise in England and South Africa. The 
court will apply the law of salvage in the US if; (1) the property is in marine peril of being lost; (2) 
a person has rendered assistance voluntarily not out of a duty; and (3) the person's assistance is 
successful in whole or in part or contributes to the success of saving the property.59 If the salvor can 
satisfy these elements of salvage he will be entitled to exclusive salvage rights which will mature 
into a salvage award when he recovers the property.  
 The elements of salvage in the US are also based on those of the International Convention 
on Salvage 1989 and are premised upon the notion that the shipwreck has an owner and th  owner 
ought to reward the salvor for rescuing the vessel from peril. Similarly to salvage law in other 
jurisdictions, the issue of the existence of ‘marine peril’ with regard to a shipwreck has arisen in 
                                                 
55 Mills v Reck and Others 1988 (3) SA 92 (C) 
56As will be seen below, however, the court dealt with this case pursuant to their civil jurisdiction rather than their 
admiralty jurisdiction which would have required the application of English law. 
57 Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd (1906) 23 SC 169 
58 Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd (1906) 23 SC 169, at 173 
59 Daniel P. Larsen, ‘Ownership of Historic Shipwreck in US Law’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, Vol 9, No 1 (1994), page 36 
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litigation when the law of salvage is applied to shipwrecks. 
 Historically, the definition of a marine peril in the US has involved sinking ships in rough 
seas, vessels ablaze by an accidental fire, a vessel running aground, engine failure, or similar 
catastrophes.60 A shipwreck lying on the bottom of the ocean for hundreds of years, slowly being 
covered by sand and sediment does not seem to fall within the definition of marine peril. However, 
courts in the United States have successfully extended the definition of marine peril to be able to 
include shipwrecks. 
 The court in Treasure Salvors I introduced the new concept of marine peril with respect to 
shipwrecks: 
‘Marine peril includes more than the threat of a storm, fire or piracy to a vessel in 
navigation... Even after discovery of the shipwrecks location it is still in peril of being lost 
through the actions of the elements.’61 
Applying this definition to shipwrecks, US courts have been able to find a sufficient marine 
peril upon which to be able to apply the law of salvage.  
 
3(i)(d)(1) - Cases applying salvage law to shipwreck 
The law of the United States traditionally follows the concept tha'admiralty has historically 
disfavoured the law of finds, preferring instead the distinct policies of the law of salvage'.62 
 In Zych v Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the SB “Lady 
Elgin” 63, the Lady Elgin sank in Lake Michigan in September 1860 after a collision with the  
Augusta. The Aetna Insurance Co. paid the claims on the Lady Elgin and became subgrogated 
owners of the vessel. In 1989, 129 years later, the ship was located by salvor Harry Zych who filed 
an action seeking title to the vessel. Zych alleged that abandonment had occurred because of the 
lapse of 129 years and the owner’s failure to make any efforts during th s period to recover the 
vessel. The subrogated owners defended on the basis that the failur  to make recovery efforts was 
due to the lack of technology available to locate the wreck until Zych was able to locate it in 1989 
through the use of new technology. The federal court agreed with the subrograted owners that they 
were not required to engage in salvage efforts to avoid abandoning its interest when those efforts 
would have had minimal chances for success. The court therefore appli d salvage law to the claim 
awarding a salvage award to Zych. 
 The US courts preference in applying the law of salvage was again shown in the case of The 
                                                 
60 Daniel P. Larsen, ‘Ownership of Historic Shipwreck in US Law’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
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Central America64. The Central America was a wooden-hulled, side-wheel ship built to carry 
passengers down the east coast of the United States to Panama. At the time of its sinking, the 
Central America was transporting more than 600 passengers, many of whom were carrying 
substantial sums of gold as well as a cargo of commercial gold w rth in excess of US$ 1 250 000 
(1857 value).65 The wreck of the Central America could not be found for over a hundred years until 
1988 when it was discovered by the Columbus-America Discovery Group ('CADG'). CADG 
commenced proceedings in rem against the wreck alleging that, under the law of finds, it was the 
finder of the wreck and entitled to have itself declared the owner of the treasure; or, in the 
alternative, that under the law of salvage, it was salvor of the wreck and entitled to a salvage award.  
 The US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially awarded CADG the 
entirety of the treasure. The crucial issue for the court was whether salvage law or the law of finds 
should apply. The insurance companies contended the law of salvage was applicable, while CADG 
argued for the application of the law of finds. The court held that the law of finds was applicable 
and CADG was the 'finder' and, therefore, sole owner of the Central America and its gold. 
 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision, concluding that salv ge law should be 
applied, that the Central America had not been abandoned, and that CADG was entitled only to a 
salvage award. On remand, the district court held that CADG was entitled to a 90 per cent salvage 
award for the recovery of the gold. However, this was a Pyrrhic victory for CADG as the projected 
costs of the award were $30 million and the amount of gold recovered was only $21 million, 
resulting in a final salvage award of around $19 million. This was far from the $1 billion of gold 
cargo though to have existed at the beginning of the case. 
 The decision in the Central America accords with the clear policy statements of the US 
courts in favouring treating those in possession of wrecks as salvors in possession rather than 
finders seeking ownership.  
 This view was also taken in the case of R.M.S. Titanic, Incorporated v The Wrecked and 
Abandoned Vessel66 where the court stated that: 
‘one who would come upon a lost ship on the high seas would be encouraged to refrain from 
attempting to save it and to entertain the idea of taking valuable c rgo for himself as finder. 
Indeed, a free finders-keepers policy is but a short step from active piracy and pill ging.’67 
 Salvage on the Titanic began in 1987 by Titanic Ventures and IFREMER who recovered 1 
800 objects in 1987.68 In 1993, the Office of Maritime Affairs of the Ministry of Equipment, 
                                                 
64 The Central America: Columbus-America Discovery Group v Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co (1992) AMC 2705 
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Transportation and Tourism awarded title of the 1 800 objects salved from the Titanic in the 1987 
expedition to Titanic Ventures. Titanic Ventures later sold its interest in the salvage operation and 
recovered objects to RMST, which recovered 800 artefacts from the Titanic in 1993.69  
 RMST recovered further artefacts from expeditions carried out in 1994 and 1996. Based on 
these artefacts, the Eastern District of Virginia awarded exclusive salvage rights to RMST in 1994 
and the Fourth Court affirmed that RMST was the first party to successfully salvage the Titanic. 
Although the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for determination of the salvage award in 2006, 
RMST failed to submit requests for a salvage award for two years, and continued to assert that it 
had received ownership rights to the Titanic.70 
 In response to these assertions of ownership, in October 2007, the District Court of the 
Eastern District of Virginia rejected RMST's public claim and reprimanded RMST, stating that ‘the 
court will no longer tolerate these manoeuvres by RMST to circumvent the court's final ruling that 
RMST is the salvor, and not the owner of the artefacts’.71 RMST were given 60 days to submit an 
application for a salvage award. This strongly supports the courts willingness to apply the law of 
salvage to shipwrecks. 
 RMST were eventually granted 100 per cent of the fair market value of the artefacts and 
reserved the right to decide how that award would be paid. However, a yar later, the district court 
Eastern District of Virginia awarded title (subject to the conditions and covenants) of the artefacts to 
RMST as no appropriate buyer had offered to purchase the Titanic for the fair market price within a 
year.72 
The cases of the Titanic and The Central America support the view that US courts are willing to 
apply the law of salvage to cases involving the discovery of shipwrecks by salvors. 
In contrast to England and South Africa, a salvage award is a likely possibility for a salvor in 
the US courts. This may explain why many salvors of shipwreck have in the past decided to seize 
the jurisdiction of the US courts. 
 
3(i)(e) - Is salvage law adequate? 
Whether a court will apply the law of salvage to a shipwreck is therefore unclear. Moreover, it is 
questionable whether the application of salvage law to shipwrecks is appropriate as it arguably does 
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not take into account important considerations of all interested parties. As discussed above, many 
States do not apply the law of salvage to shipwrecks as they belive that such legislation cannot be 
extended and applied to ships that have already sunken to the bottom of the ocean, one of the 
reasons being that a shipwreck cannot be said to be in 'peril' for the purposes of the definition of 
salvage. 
 As discussed above, the application of salvage law by the US courts in the cases of The 
Central America and The Titanic has produced obscure and perhaps inadequate or inappropriate 
results. In the case of The Central America the court’s decision to apply the law of salvage was a 
Pyrrhic victory for both parties. Although the underwriters were held to remain the owners of the 
discovered treasure, they were only awarded 10 per cent of the value of the treasure recovered and 
lost possession of the treasure to the salvor for marketing purposes. The alvors, on the other hand, 
were awarded a salvage award of 90 per cent of the value of the treasure which resulted in 
inadequate compensation for all the costs involved in attaining the salvage order.  
 In the Titanic, although the courts applied the law of salvage to the wreck and artefacts, the 
decision to apply salvage law or the law of finds ultimately did not ma ter. The end result of 
applying both legal regimes was the same. Under the law of salvage, if no one claims title to the 
shipwreck or artefacts, the court can award title to the property under the law of finds to pay the 
award. As there is no owner of the Titanic to provide the salvage award, the court ordered the sale 
of the collection in a judicial sale to generate revenue for the salvage award. Accordingly, the court 
awarded title of the artefacts to RMST. The issue of there bing no owner to pay the salvage award 
is a highly likely scenario with a shipwreck, particularly historical ones. When ships sink, insurers 
are likely to have paid the shipowners and thus becoming the subrogated owners and then this raises 
the issue of whether there has been abandonment of the vessel. 
Moreover, the law of salvage fails to take into account of certain considerations and may 
promote careless and hasty salvage efforts by salvors. Craig Forrest expressed his concerns with 
applying salvage law on shipwrecks as including ‘the splitting up of collections and the hasty 
excavation techniques required minimizing commercial costs and maximising the salvage award’.73 
Conversely, however, applying salvage law to a shipwreck provides the court with more 
control over the salvage operation. As courts are becoming more protective of the historic and 
archaeological value of shipwrecks, applying salvage to the wrecks allows the court to deny the 
right of salvage by persons who do not employ sophisticated preservation techniques. Moreover, the 
court may base the salvage award upon the salvor's good faith and his succe s in restoring the 
property from its imperilled position, which would include maintaining the wr ck's archaeological 
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value when removing it from peril.74 In the case of Klein75, for example, the court denied the 
plaintiff a salvage award for recovering articles from a histor c wreck within Biscayne National 
Park.76 The District Court, the Court of Appeals stated that, ‘the plaintiff's unauthorised disturbance 
of one of the oldest shipwrecks in the Park and his unscientific removal of the artefacts did more to 
create a marine peril than to prevent one’. Similarly, in the case of MDM Salvage v Unidentified, 
Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, the district court in Florida denied a group of salvors 
exclusive salvage rights to salvage a wreck partly because ‘they have not sought to preserve the 
archaeological integrity of the area’.77 
 
3(i)(f) - Concluding remarks on salvage 
The law of salvage is therefore not applied to shipwrecks under English and South African law due 
to the fact that a shipwreck is not considered to be in ‘marine peril’. Under US law, however, the 
position is different where the courts have extended the definition of a ‘marine peril’ to encompass 
the perils associated with a shipwreck. The law of salvage is therefore applied to shipwrecks under 
US law. The different approach by courts in different jurisdictions illustrates the significance of the 
country the claim is brought under. Moreover, even if the law of salvage is applied, it is argued that 
this doctrine does not take into account the considerations of all parties who may have a claim 
against the shipwreck. The law of salvage’s lack of clarity, lack of international uniformity and 
failure to take into account important considerations illustrates th  importance of developing an 
international convention to better deal with the discovery of shipwrecks in the high seas. 
 
3(ii) - LAW OF FINDS 
 
The law of finds, or 'finders-keepers' principle, is an alternative set of rules to deal with rights to a 
shipwreck. Applying the law of finds, the finder becomes the owner of the property immediately 
after the finder has actual or constructive possession. This section will deal with the origins and 
application of the law of finds in various jurisdictions, the issue of abandonment and whether 
applying the law of finds to shipwrecks is appropriate. 
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3(ii)(a) - Origins of the law of finds 
The Laws of Oleron were introduced to England by King Richard I towards the end of the twelfth 
century.78 The Laws of Oleron were the first to apply the law of finds in the marine context, 
providing that ‘if a man happens to find anything in the sea... if it be precious stones, fishes or 
treasure of the sea, which never belonged to any man.... it belongs to the first finder.’ 
 In England, statute modified the law of finds to provide that rathe t an the first finder 
gaining title, the Crown assumed title to all shipwrecks that were not claimed by the owner within 
one year and one day from the date of the find. Both the law of finds and the law of salvage have 
passed to the United States and South Africa along with the English common law. 
 Generally when a claim is made under the law of finds, the court will award title to the 
shipwreck if; (1) the property is abandoned, and; (2) the claimed has reduced the property to his 
possession. Claimants generally commence proceedings to gain exclusive possession of the wreck 
before they recover the entire wreck. Exclusive possession thus allows the claimant to obtain an 
injunction prohibiting other salvors from carrying out salvage operations on the wreck. Moreover, 
under the law of finds, exclusive possession gives title of the wreck to the finder who becomes the 
owner. The finder or owner will not lose title unless he abandons the wreck.  
 
3(ii)(b) - Law of Finds in England and Wales 
The application of law to shipwrecks in England and Wales is largely governed by statute, namely 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (MSA 1995). Sections 231 – 235 deal with vessels in distress. 
Sections 236 – 240 deal with wreck. Section 236(1) provides that if any person finds or takes 
possession of any wreck in United Kingdom waters or finds or takes possession of any wreck 
outside United Kingdom waters and brings it within those waters h shall give notice to the receiver 
of wrecks stating that he has found or taken possession of it and describing the marks by which it 
may be recognised. 
 Section 239(1) provides that the owner of any wreck in possession of the receiver who 
establishes his claim to the wreck to the satisfaction of the rec iver within one year from the time 
when the wreck came into the receiver's possession shall, on paying the fees and expenses due, be 
entitled to have the wreck delivered or the proceeds of sale paid to him. 
 Sections 241 – 244 deal with unclaimed wreck. Section 241 provides that Her Majesty and 
Her Royal successors are entitled to all unclaimed wreck found in the United Kingdom or in United 
Kingdom waters except in places where Her Majesty or any of Her Royal predecessors has granted 
the right to any other person. 
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 The question is how the English courts will deal with the situation where a salvor discovers 
and salves a shipwreck in the high seas and seeks to exercise ownership over that wreck in England. 
 The relatively recent case of Pierce v Bemis (The Lusitania)79 established the principle that 
unclaimed wreck found outside UK territorial waters belongs to the finder and not to the Crown. 
The case involved a passenger liner called The Lusitania which was sailing from the United 
Kingdom to New York. In 1915 she was torpedoed by a German Submarine and proceeded to sink. 
She subsequently was abandoned and sank outside the United Kingdom territorial waters. Insurers 
compensated the owners for her loss and the ship and the contents belonging t  the owners became 
the property of the insurers. In 1982, the Lusitania was located on the sea bed and the claimants 
salvaged a number of chattels and brought those items into the United Kingdom and in respect of 
which no title had been proved. These items were brought ashore in Britain and were seized by the 
local receiver of wreck. The claimants sought a declaration from the court that, in the absence of the 
true owners, they had good title to the items that had been either part of the passengers' personal 
property or part of the cargo. 
 The case depended on the interpretation of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (MSA 1894), 
which contained a comprehensive code for the treatment of wreck, very similar to that contained in 
the MSA 1995. One of the issues for the court was whether the Lusitania fell within the definition 
of ‘wreck’, which was defined as including ‘derelict found in or on the sores of the sea or any tidal 
water’.80 The court held that a ship is derelict in the legal sense of the term if the master and crew 
have abandoned her at sea without any intention of returning to her and without hope on their part 
of recovering her. 
 The court looked at two cases to determine the definition of abandonment of a wreck. In The 
Aquila81 Sir William Scott said that ‘it is sufficient if there has been an abandonment at sea by the 
master and crew, without hope of recovery, I say, without hope of recovery, because a mere quitting 
of the ship for the purpose of procuring assistance from shore, or with an intention of returning to 
her again, is not an abandonment.’ 
 The defendants, the Department of Transport, however argued that the Lusitania was not 
‘derelict’ for the purposes of the MSA 1894 and attempted to rely on the case of Bradley v H. 
Newsom, Sons and Co.82 The case involved a vessel called The Jupiter which was on a voyage from 
Archangel to Hull and was attacked by an enemy submarine similarly to the Lusitania. The master 
and crew were compelled to leave the ship. However, the ship did not sink and was eventually 
found by a British patrol boat and taken into a British port. The House of Lords held that the Jupiter 
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was not derelict when the master and crew were ordered to leave by th  enemy submarine because 
their departure was involuntary. 
 In the judgement of The Lusitania the judges set out the opinion of Viscount Haldane setting 
out his view on abandonment.  
‘The master and crew really left the steamer not of their own volition but under duress, 
being forced to do so... The act of having been forced away from her is one thing. An 
intention to leave her derelict is quite a different thing. They did not leave the vessel. It was 
really taken from them. I think there is confusion in the judgment of the courts below 
between a being parted from the vessel by force of arms and a quitting of it as an act of free 
will. No doubt if they had quitted it because they desired to make sure of saving themselves 
from being drowned if she went down, that would have been an act to the performance of 
which they would have been moved by a motive, none the less that it was one of the most 
potent. It would have been an act of volition, just as on the other hand it is plainly at act of 
volition when men elect to perish with a war vessel instead of being taken prisoners and 
saved.’83 
 The House of Lords applied this reasoning to the facts of The Lusitania and held that there 
could be no doubt that when the master and crew and passengers abandoned the vessel, they did so 
in order to save their own lives and without any hope or intention of returning to her. The House of 
Lords went on to say that if there had been any doubt as to the state of mind of those who 
abandoned the vessel, the matter would be put beyond doubt by the fact that the Cunard Steamship 
Co (the shipowners) claimed and were paid by the underwriters on the basis of an actual total loss 
of the ship. Moreover, an inference was drawn from the agreed facts and from the lapse of 67 years 
before any attempted was made to salve the contents.84 
 The second obstacle that the finders of The Lusitania had to overcome to attain title was 
whether the Crown had better title as a result of the provisions in MSA 1894. Section 518 of the 
MSA 1894 required that only wreck found inside the limits of the UK territorial waters should be 
delivered to the receiver of wrecks. However, the Merchant Shipping Act 1906 (MSA 1906) 
enlarged the application of that section to include wreck found outside UK territorial waters and 
brought within the UK.85 It was clear that there was indeed an initial obligation by the finders of 
The Lusitania to deposit all salvaged items from any location with the receiv r of wreck. The 
dispute concerned whether the MSA 1906 had extended the application of secti n 523 of the MSA 
1894 so that the Crown would have title to any unclaimed wreck outside UK t rritorial waters that 
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were brought within the UK. Section 523 of the MSA 1894 declared the rigt of the Crown to all 
wreck found in the UK and unclaimed within a year, except where the Crown has granted the 
franchise to a subject. The House of Lords eventually held that the Crown's right to claim a droit of 
Admiralty was limited to an unclaimed wreck found inside UK terrio ial waters,  and although 
section 518 had been extended by section 72 of the MSA 1906 so that, where a wr ck lying outside 
territorial waters was found and brought within the UK, the finder had the duty to deliver the wreck 
to the receiver of wrecks, the Act of 1906 did not alter or extend the Crown's right over wrecks; and 
that, therefore, there was no droit of Admiralty over the wreck and in the absence of the true 
owners, the claimants had good title.86 
 The decision in The Lusitania is significant for several reasons. It removes an impediment to 
the commercial viability of prospective salvage operations on other wrecks such as the Titanic.87 
The case clarifies the position in England on the abandonment of a wreck requiring that the master 
and crew must abandon without any intention of returning to the ship whether she is afloat or sank. 
Secondly, the case clarifies the scope of the Crowns entitlement to unclaimed wreck by limiting it to 
unclaimed wreck inside the territorial waters of England. 
 The position of a salvor seeking to assert rights in a shipwreck in England is therefore 
relatively clear requiring proof of abandonment on the part of the original owner. 
 
3(ii)(c) - Law of Finds in South Africa 
The issue of abandonment is also the principle issue in South Africa. Whether the party recovering 
the wreck is entitled to ownership of the property or a salvage reward will depend on whether the 
shipwreck is still owned by its original owner, or the original owner's subrogated insurer, or whether 
the shipwreck has been abandoned by the owner and is unowned property. It is important to note 
that applicable law to such maritime claims is governed by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation 
Act 1983 (AJRA). Despite the argument that English law be applicable to the issue of abandonment 
of shipwreck88, the South African courts have generally dealt with the issue applying Roman Dutch 
law in the exercise of their municipal jurisdiction.89 
In South Africa, the right of a shipowner to abandon its rights of ownership to a ship which 
has been wrecked is clear.90 For example, in the case of The Paris Maru91 the Supreme Court of 
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Appeal recognised the right of the owner to abandon its property, and ruled that 'liability for wreck 
removal costs in terms of the then harbour regulations only attaches to im who is the owner at the 
time the Administration elects to exercise the power conferred on it.'92 
The abandonment of property rights is known in Roman Dutch law as derelictio, and once 
property has been abandoned it becomes a res nullius. In the case of The Antipolis93 Joubert JA 
stated that 'according to our common law, a right of ownership is lost through derelictio when an 
owner waives or abandons his case with the intention of not longer being owner.' 
 If the property is res nullius then the party recovering or raising the wreck may acquire 
ownership by way of occupatio which involves taking possession of the property with an intention 
to acquire ownership.  
 In South Africa therefore, the essential question of fact remains the same as that in the 
England, namely; has the original owner of the property abandoned it and where the wreck was 
abandoned to the underwriters in return for indemnification, so that the insurers are subrogated 
owners, have the underwriters abandoned the vessel? 
 Similarly to the case in England, the question of abandonment is a question of fact. Whether 
there has been abandonment of the property will depend on the circumstances of each case. The 
court will look at various factors to draw an inference as to the owner’s intention. One of the main 
factors that the court will consider will be the time that hasp sed from the time of the wreck 
without any action being taken to salve it. The longer the period of time, he more likely it would be 
that the owner has abandoned the ship. The inference that the owner has abandoned the ship, 
however, has not been lightly drawn and the courts have grappled with determining factual 
abandonment of wreck. 
 In the case of Salvage Association of London v SA Salvage Syndicate94 (The Thermopolae) 
was wrecked in Table Bay in 1899. She was abandoned by her owners to their underwriters and 
began to break up on the sea bed causing the cargo to be dispersed.  The underwriters, now 
subrogated owners, took no steps to recover any of the property for seven y ars. The defendant 
syndicate, who had a salvage licence to seek treasure, recovered ingots of tin and copper from the 
wreck site, but the salvage operation was interrupted by the Salvage Association who was 
representing the underwriters. The Salvage Association obtained an interdict from the court 
preventing the salvors from working the wreck and disposing of any property they had already 
recovered. 
 The defendant salvage syndicate were of the view that the wreck had been abandoned and 
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that by taking possession of the abandoned property they had acquired own rship of it. The court 
held, however, that, 'a person whose property has gone down in a shipwreck cannot be presumed to 
have abandoned it because for some years he has taken no steps to raise it. He may hope that in the 
meanwhile some appliances may be discovered by which the recovery f his property might be 
discovered by which the recovery of his property might be facilitted’. The judge went on to say 
that 'clear proof of abandonment must be given, and in the present cas here is not... such clear 
proof of abandonment.' 
 The judge did hold, however, that the salvors as the party 'in possession' were entitled to 
protection against all but the true owner, and in this case the underwriters who had succeeded the 
owner's rights. The interdict was granted subject to the filing of proof within 2 months that the 
applicant party represented the owners/underwriters. 
 The lapse of seven years in this case was not a long enough time period for the court to be 
able to infer that the owners had abandoned ownership of The Thermopolae. There seems to be 
nothing inconsistent with the decision by the English courts in The Lusitania where the court held 
that 'it is a necessary inference from the agreed factsand from the lapse of 67 years before any 
attempt was made to salve the contents that the owners of the contents had abandoned their 
property.'95 
 
3(ii)(c)(1) -  Assertion of ownership: possession? 
Once it is established that property has been abandoned, the party recovering the property must take 
possession or control the property to be able to acquire ownership. The Sout African cases dealing 
with this point have involved shipwrecks within South African territorial w ters rather than the high 
seas but nonetheless illustrate the courts approach to possession.  
 The case of Underwater Construction & Salvage Co (Pty) Ltd v Bell96 involved a vessel 
called The Hypatia which was a wreck off Robben Island. In 1967, a salvor called Harry Fuchs 
loosened and separated four blades from the wrecks propeller by blasting them off the propeller 
with the intention of becoming the owner. Two of the blades were taken shore while he marked the 
others with a buoy which was attached to the shaft where the blades y. A second salvor 
disconnected the buoy and took the remaining two blades ashore and alleged that he had acquired 
possession and ownership. The court held that the wreck was res nullius so the question remained 
whether either salvor could acquire ownership by occupatio.  
 The court held that 'ownership is acquired as soon as there is a sizure with the intention of 
becoming owner. Ownership once acquired cannot be lost by a mere failu to remain in physical 
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possession. The fact that the two propeller blades were not hoisted onto the ship did not mean that 
they had not been seized.' The court went onto say that the act of forcing the blades apart from the 
wreck with the intention of acquiring ownership was sufficient to give him title. The blasting of the 
blades off the propeller was legal seizure sufficient to found occupatio. 
 
3(ii)(d) - Law of Finds in the United States of America 
In the United States, under the law of finds, one of the fundamental issues that the courts must 
determine is whether the shipwreck in question has been abandoned. As we have discussed above, 
courts are generally unwilling to find that shipwrecks have been abadoned by their owners even 
after the passing of a significant period of time. Moreover, when looking at the law of salvage we 
saw that the US courts are reluctant to find abandonment and would rather apply the law of salvage 
to shipwreck.  
 In the case of Central America the court stated that the law of finds may be applied in only 
two types of cases; firstly, in those cases where the owners have expressly and publicly abandoned 
their interest and, secondly, in those cases involving ancient shipwrecks where no owner appears to 
claim items recovered from the vessel. The court also held that evidence of abandonme t must be 
shown by clear and convincing evidence, such as an express declaration of abandonment.97 
Abandonment must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.98 It was held that the mere passage 
of time does not conclusively establish abandonment; however a significant passage of time does 
raise the inference of abandonment.99 The judge expressed his dislike of finding abandonment of a 
shipwreck where someone has been involuntarily removed of their property at sea and th t the 
owner retains title forever if he has parted with his property involuntarily.  
 The amount of time necessary to be able to infer abandonment has not bee  consistent or 
clear, however, in two District Court cases in the USA the judges have suggested that 60 years is the 
minimum time of desertion required for finding that there has been abandonment of a shipwreck.100 
 The unwillingness of US courts to find abandonment in shipwrecks stems fro  the Treasure 
Salvor cases101 involving the disposition of the Atocha and its sister ship the Santa Margarita, 
Spanish  Galleons sunk by a hurricane in 1622, nine and a half miles off the shores of the Florida 
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Keys. The courts eventually gave title of the wrecks to the salvors of the wrecks, Mel Fisher and his 
company, Treasure Salvors Inc. Although the court found abandonment, the judges in the case 
acknowledged at least three situations where an owner may not be fictitious.  
First, the court acknowledged the possibility of a claim by the country of origin of the 
wreck.102 This suggests that the government of the flag under which the ship sailed may have a 
claim to these ancient ships as ‘successor-owner’.103  
 Secondly, the court acknowledged that ownership may be vested in an existi g person, or 
heirs of the actual owner. For example, the Court in The Central America was surprised that 
descendants of passengers did not bring claims of ownership in the treasure. This suggests that 
descendants of owners may have a claim of ownership to the sunken treasure. 
 Thirdly, the courts acknowledged that an owner may presently exist as ‘ uccessive-owner’ 
by finding insurance companies as ‘subrogated owners’ after indemnifying the original owners for 
the loss of the ship. This is important as it may apply to many shipwrecks because some insurance 
companies have existed for hundreds of years, such as Lloyds of London which was established in 
1688.104 
 Two cases that we have looked at regarding salvage have expanded the third 
acknowledgement by the court of insurers being ‘successive-owners’. Fi tly, in Zych v 
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel105 the court found that the ship was not abandoned 
because the underwriters had purchased title by paying $11 993.20 on the policy in 1860, thereby 
obtaining ownership rights.   
 The second major case regarding insurers was the case of The Central America where the 
court held that the insurance company destroying insurance documents uni tentionally did not 
evidence intent to abandon. Furthermore, the fact that some of the insur rs had engaged in salvage 
negotiations in the mid 1980s, when it became technologically feasibl to salvage the wreck 
supported the fact that the ship had not been abandoned.  
 These cases are very important. They make it very difficult for finders of shipwrecks to 
assert ownership without strong compelling evidence of abandonment. Moreover, they provide a 
cause of action to anyone who may be a successor-owner to the original owner, whether it is 
insurance companies, the nation of origin of the vessel, or the descendants of the owners.106 
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3(ii)(e) - Concluding remarks 
This chapter has illustrated that a claimant has two alternative claims over a shipwreck. The 
claimant may attempt to assert property rights over the wreck thus making him the owner or he may 
claim for a reward for having salvaged the property of the owner under the law of salvage. 
Furthermore, the case law has shown how the courts have applied thes  legal doctrines differently 
in different jurisdictions. One significant difference is that the US courts clearly apply the law of 
salvage to shipwrecks whereas the English and South African courts d  not. In relation to the law of 
finds a significant factor has been the courts willingness to find that the original owner has 
abandoned the shipwreck. These differences emphasises the importance f dev loping international 






























The next contestants in the tug of war for the spoils of shipwrecks are national or State 
governments. Thousands of State-owned vessels lie within, and in waters beyond, the territorial sea 
and contiguous zone. Many such vessels are now becoming subject to the unauthorised disturbance 
or recovery by salvors and treasure hunters as a result of the recent advances in science and 
technology. Growing international concern over such salvage operations has resulted in the recent 
practice in which States have claimed sovereign rights over shipwrecks (and their cargo) that were 
discovered and salved by treasure-hunting ventures from the seabed.107 Sovereign immunity can be 
defined as a legal doctrine that concerns the protection which a State is giv n from being sued in the 
courts of other States. A ship, and perhaps a shipwreck, that is owned by a State may, therefore, be 
protected by sovereign immunity, and thus be immune from the arrest and jurisdiction of other State 
courts. 
The reasons States claim sovereign rights over such shipwrecks vary. M ny of the 
shipwrecks are considered to be objects of an historical nature, and which, ith the passing of time, 
have acquired scientific and cultural value to the flag-State. In addition, such State shipwrecks, 
particularly sunken warships, may contain objects of sensitive national security. They often also 
contain unexploded ordnance that could pose a danger to human health and the marine environment 
if disturbed.108 The claims by States of their sovereign rights are therefore closely related to the idea 
of underwater cultural heritage.  
 The claims concerning sunken vessels have mainly been brought by flag-States on the basis 
of their sovereign rights over such vessels. However, when discussing the law applicable to State 
vessels, it is important to appreciate the difference between issues relating to the jurisdiction of the 
flag-State and the issue of ownership.109 This chapter will begin by making the distinction between 
these two issues and setting out how the principle of sovereign immunity has been applied to state 
vessels under customary international law and whether this immunity co inues to exist once a state 
vessel has sunk and converted into a shipwreck. This will involve looking at how the courts have 
dealt with the issue of sovereign immunity. This chapter will then s ek to address the issue of 
ownership of state vessels, looking particularly at the issue of abandonment. 
 The claims by flag-States on the basis of their sovereign rights are often challenged by 
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interests by other interested parties, such as, for example, the universal interest in protecting the 
cultural heritage of the shipwreck and cargo. Moreover, although States may have sovereignty over 
a shipwreck, this does not exclude private ownership of the ship itself and its cargo.110 Although 
some shipwrecks may be very ancient, it is still very possible to identify the legitimate owners, or 
their heirs of some objects belonging to the cargo of a ship through historic information. 
Furthermore, States other than the flag-State may have claims for property or sovereignty over the 
cargo of the shipwreck, such as, for example, the State of origin of the cargo or the State of 
nationality of the proprietors of the cargo. These other States may argue that some of the cargo is 
part of their cultural heritage and should be subject to their sovereign rights.111 
 
4(i) - Ownership and Sovereign Immunity 
The distinction between jurisdiction and ownership of shipwrecks was clerly set out by Craig 
Forrest where he states that jurisdiction relates to the ability of astate to control activities in its 
territory or over its nationals.112 States will have jurisdiction over vessels that fly the flag of their 
State, notwithstanding the ownership of that vessel. A flag-State ther fore has jurisdiction over its 
own State vessels as well as private merchant vessels that ail under its flag. Article 92 of the 
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) provides that ‘ships shall sail under the flag 
of one State only and shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.’ A coastal state, 
on the other hand, has jurisdiction to control activities within its territorial waters, which also 
include activities of a vessel sailing under a foreign flag.113 However, customary international law 
has always recognised that government ships operated for non-commercial purposes, including 
warships, are immune from coastal State enforcement. Having established that Flag-States have 
jurisdiction over their nationals (i.e. State owned vessels) and that in ernational law recognises the 
sovereign immunity of State-owned vessels it follows that determining ownership is vital for the 
purposes of sovereign immunity. 
 
4(ii) - Sovereign Immunity of Warships and State Vessels 
Many State vessels, or indeed many shipwrecks, have been warships. Due to the sensitivity 
regarding warships and State owned ships, many maritime and former colonial powers want to 
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retain exclusive jurisdiction over and ownership of these vessels.114 One of the main policy 
considerations supporting the application of the principle of sovereign immunity to S ate vessels has 
been based on mutual respect for each sovereign State's armed forces and governmental activities 
and more generally equality of states.115 
Being able to define whether a vessel is a warship is important as it will provide the ship 
with sovereign immunity. The definition is set out in Article 29 UNCLOS providing: 
‘For the purposes of this convention, “warships” means a ship belonging to the armed forces 
of a state bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the 
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the state and whose name 
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is 
under the regular armed forces discipline.’ 
Once it is established that a ship is a ‘warship’, Article 95 UNCLOS provides that ‘warships on the 
high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag-State.’ 
Furthermore, State owned or State operated vessels are also protected by Article 96 UNCLOS 
which provides that ‘ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-
commercial service shall, on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any 
State other than the flag-State.’ Moreover, the immunity for warships and other non-commercial 
vessels owned or operated by a State is extended further into the salvage of such vessels.116 
 
UNCLOS and the 1989 Salvage Convention therefore provide States with the power to 
claim sovereign immunity over the warships and State vessels. This is significant because it follows 
that salvors cannot claim ownership or a salvage reward over warships or State owned vessels in the 
courts of other jurisdictions as they are protected by sovereign immunity. 
 Three important questions must be answered before it can be determin d whether a 
shipwreck is subject to sovereign immunity. Firstly, the question of whether a shipwreck can fall 
within the definition ‘ship’ for the purposes of immunity under UNCLOS and international 
customary law. Secondly, the identity and nationality of the shipwrecks and their cargo must be 
determined to create the necessary link between the ship and its flag-State as the primary legal basis 
for justifying a claim by such State over such wreck both under intna ional and domestic law. 
Thirdly, if the shipwreck is found to be State-owned, the question of whether it has been abandoned 
must be determined. 
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4(iii) - Is a shipwreck a ‘ship’ for the purposes of sovereign immunity? 
The first question that must be answered is whether a shipwreck is capable of being a ‘ship’ for the 
purposes of sovereign immunity. Craig Forrest notes various commentators wh  have the view that 
sunken vessels cease to be ships and are, therefore, no longer entitld to immunity.117 Calfish is of 
the opinion that a wreck may no longer qualify as a vessel subject to the exclusive authority of its 
flag-State.118 Riphagen stated that in the case of sunken ships ‘it is understandable th t such 
“objects” cannot simply retain indefinitely the status under international law of a ship.’119 Migliorini 
stated that a shipwreck has lost the characteristics of a warship and should simply be subject to the 
same rules as any other historical shipwreck.120 If it were accepted that shipwrecks are not ships, 
they cannot be subject to the protection of sovereign immunity and can be subject to a claim of 
salvage, or ownership, as if they were a privately owned vessel.  
 Notwithstanding the semantics of the definition of a ship and whether a shipwreck falls 
within that definition, the wrecks are still property of the State nd could continue to be subject to 
the general principles of State immunity for State property used for non-commercial purposes. In 
some cases, for example recently sunken warships, the shipwrecks would still contain State 
intelligence, information and secrets, meaning that the shipwreck is stillfulfilling an important State 
non-commercial function. This argument, however, loses strength when one considers the condition 
of a shipwreck that is decades old as it would be unlikely that any useful important intelligence, 
information or secrets would be found or still intact.  
 It is therefore not possible to conclude whether a sunken State vessl, particularly one of 
historical nature, which no longer fulfils a government non-commercial function, can be said to be 
subject to sovereign immunity as there appears to be no conventional or customary international law 
on the issue. Moreover, the historical maritime powers such as Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom have failed to adopt any consistent policies.121 
 The US courts however seem to recognise the idea of sovereign immun ty of warships lying 
at the bottom of the sea irrespective of how long they have laid there.  In the case of Sea Hunt, Inc v 
Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels,122 the Fourth Circuit Federal Court of Appeal held that 
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a State could refuse salvage services, and where they were undertaken against the wishes of the 
State, no salvage award would be forthcoming.  The case involved claims to two Spanish warships. 
La Galga, a 50-gun frigate was en route from Havana to Spain, carrying Spanish soldiers and some 
English military prisoners. It encountered a hurricane near Bermuda an  eventually sank near the 
Virginia coast. Juno was lost in 1802 when the 34-gun frigate was sailing from Veracruz to Spain, 
carrying Spanish soldiers, their families, and some civilian officials. During a severe storm it sprang 
leaks and eventually sank with the lost of at least 415 lives. Sea Hunt, Inc found them and issued 
permits for their salvage. As mentioned above, the US Court of Appeals h ld that because the ships 
had not been abandoned by Spain, they were not subject to salvage. Both Spain and the United 
States gave emphasis to the fact that the Spanish vessels, like many sunken vessels of the United 
States military, serve as sacred military gravesites.123 The circuit court gave close attention to the 
concerns of Spain and the United States that such sunken vessels serve as the graves of sailors and 
soldiers, as well as civilians. The court quoted part of the amicus curiae brief of th  United States: 
 
‘The United States “is the owner of military vessels, thousands of which have been lost at 
sea, along with their crews. In supporting Spain, the United States seeks to insue that its 
sunken vessels and lost crews are treated as sovereign ships and honoured graves, and are 
not subject to exploration, or exploitation, by private parties seeking treasures of the sea.’124 
 
On the other hand, the decision is consistent with traditional salvage aw that allows an 
owner to refuse salvage services in circumstances where a reasonable shipowner would do so. In the 
case of historic shipwrecks which have been lying on the sea bed for many years and are not 
considered to be in immediate marine peril, it would seem reasonable for the shipowner, i.e. the 
State, to refuse salvage. This express and reasonable prohibition of salvage services by an owner is 
provided for in Article 19 of the 1989 Salvage Convention. States, however, are entitl d to make a 
reservation not applying the provisions of the convention ‘when the property involved is maritime 
cultural property of pre-historical, archaeological or historic interest.’125 Therefore, for States that 
have elected to have such a reservation, it is the principle of sovereign immunity that must be relied 
on to maintain exclusive jurisdiction over such State vessels. 
The statement made by the court that Spain did not abandon (either expr ssly or by 
implication) title to the two warships, seeks to protect State vessels, thereby inherently making a 
                                                 
123 Michael White, 'Sea Hunt, Inc v Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F. 3d 534', The American Journal of 
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124 Tullio Scovazzi, ‘The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage B fore and After the 2001 UNESCO 
Convention’ Publications on Ocean Development (2003) 
125 Article 30(1)(d) International Convention of Salvage 1989 
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distinction between State vessels and non-State vessels.126 The identity of the shipwreck and cargo 
is therefore important as the finding that a shipwreck is State owned would make it subject to 
sovereign immunity. 
 
4(iv) - Identity and Nationality of shipwreck and their cargo 
In determining whether a shipwreck is subject to sovereign immunity, its' nationality and identity 
must be determined to create the link between the ship and the flag-State to form the primary legal 
basis for justifying a claim by the State over such a shipboth under international and domestic law. 
The longer the period of time passed, the more difficult it becomes to determine the nationality of 
the shipwreck. One becomes reliant on historical data and thorough esearch activity to identify the 
ship and their demise. 
 The recent case of Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes127 (the Mercedes) has provided an 
example of the uncertainty in identifying shipwrecks. The Mercedes was sailing from Peru to Cadiz 
in 1804 when it was destroyed and sank by a British ship. Although Odyssey set out to find the 
Mercedes and found it, they argued that the Court should still entertain doubt because ‘at the current 
level of site reconnaissance and study, there is no definitive archaeological evidence and all 
evidence pointing toward that theory [that the shipwreck is the M rcedes] remains 
circumstantial.’128 The court took into account various factors in determining the identity of he 
shipwreck.  
 Based on the records of the Mercedes's sister frigates, Spain plotted the likeliest area of her 
demise and the res lies within this zone. No other naval vessel matching her type, according to 
Spain, sank within this zone during this period. One of Odyssey's own experts actually admitted that 
the ‘extant documents place the Mercedes in the area’ of the site.129 Odyssey relied on what were 
considered weak arguments by stating that 'at least one individual reported land to be visible when 
the Mercedes went down, and none can be seen according to Odyssey from the site even with the 
aid of binoculars.130 
 Secondly, the Mercedes was loaded with approximately 900 000 coins, most of which were 
                                                 
126  Jason R. Harris, ‘The Protection of Sunken Warships as Gravesites at Se ’, Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, Vol 
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silver. Coincidentally, Odyssey recovered approximately 594 000 coins with an overwhelming 
disparity of silver to gold dating from the latter half of the 18th century to no later than 1804, all of 
Spanish nationality and minted almost exclusively in the ‘South American Spanish Crown Colonies’ 
and the mint in Lima in particular.131 Odyssey argued that the coins could have come from another 
vessel because Spanish coins were acceptable currency throughout the comm rcial world. Again, 
the court did not find this argument persuasive.  
 Thirdly, the cannons found at the site match the type the Mercedes would have carried. 
Although Odyssey attempted to argue that cannons are very weak indicia of a ship's nationality and 
date because they were extensively traded and distributed commodities, the Court did not find this 
persuasive.132 
 Based on the historical information concerning the location, nature, and cargo of the ship, 
the court declared that the ship was indeed the Mercedes and declare  Spain as the legitimate flag-
State. The significance of this finding was that it enabled Spain to rely on the protection of 
sovereign immunity. 
 Even if the identity and nationality of a shipwreck is certain, the nationality of the cargo may 
also be questioned. Commercial vessels used to carry both national nd foreign goods.133 In such 
cases, situations may arise where the flag-State and the State of origin of the cargo do not 
correspond, or some difficulties may arise when determining the nationality of the cargo of a 
shipwreck that had been moving from territory of a colony towards its mainland.  This problem is 
made greater by the fact that over the centuries colonies have now achieved independence and 
borders have changed making the State of origin of the cargo difficult to determine.  
 Recent cases show that the courts are not acknowledging the argument that shipwrecks and 
their cargo may have different nationalities. In the cases of La Galga and Juno134 the US courts 
stated that sunken vessels and their cargo must be presumed to belong to the flag-State unless the 
Sate clearly renounced its rights in the past. Moreover, in the above mentioned case of Nuestra 
Senora de las Mercedes the court stated that the separation of the ship and its cargo is n t 
admissible since ships and their cargoes are ‘inextricably intertwined’.135 In the US the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 (FSIA) provides the exclusive means to bring a foreign sovereign 
                                                 
131 Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc. v The Unidentified Shipwreck Vessel and the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of 
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under the jurisdiction of the US courts. The general rule is sovereign immunity; however there are a 
number of exceptions to the rule. Arguments were made that because the cargo was not owned by 
Spain, and was simply private cargo on-board the Mercedes, the FSIA did not apply. In the 
alternative, it was argued that the exception contained in s 1605(b) applied which allows the court 
to resolve a maritime lien over a vessel or cargo of a foreign state ‘if that lien is based upon a 
commercial activity of the foreign state.’ 
 Additional arguments were made by Peru, who joined the claim against Odyssey, asserting 
its sovereign rights as the State of the origin of the cargo of the Mercedes. Firstly, Peru raised the 
argument that State practice should be consistent with the general principle of international law that 
condemns colonialism, particularly when it involves the pillage of the resources of the occupied 
territory.136 During Spain's occupation, the Indian population allegedly declined by nearly 80 per 
cent due to overwork, malnutrition, and the introduction of diseases and it took over 300 years to 
replace that loss in population.137 Secondly, Peru claimed that the cargo of the Mercedes was part of 
its cultural and historic heritage and that the coins constitute a natural resource from Peru that is 
protected under international law.138 Despite the arguments made by Peru the US court dismissed 
Peru's claim denying its jurisdiction because the dispute between P ru and Spain was an inter-State 
dispute that should be settled by international means.139  
 In addition to claims made by Peru, twenty-five descendants of private persons who owned 
cargo that was on-board the ship filed claims of ownership of the cargo. Spain even admitted to the 
fact that there was private cargo on-board the Mercedes.140 It was therefore argued that although the 
Mercedes may convey sovereignty under the FSIA, the coins as private property do not. 
 Despite these arguments, the District Court explained in their order granting Spain's motion 
to dismiss that the ship and the cargo are indistinguishable for the purposes of the FSIA. 
 However, the recognition of the sovereign rights of a State over a ship and its cargo does not 
exclude the fact that private property rights may exist. In the case of the Titanic, the US court 
affirmed that private property which had been recovered in a shipwreck could not be considered as 
abandoned unless no one had claimed it after its discovery. In this case, private persons were able to 
claim their property rights over some objects before the courts f the State that was recognised to 
have jurisdiction over the objects themselves. In the case of the Mercedes however, the court 
rejected the claims of some private persons who argued that they wer  the direct descendants of the 
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owners of some of the cargo on the basis that the ship and its cargo are ‘inextricably linked.’ 
 
4(v) – Abandonment and consequences of abandonment in relation to sovereign immunity 
Once it is established that the ship and the cargo are of a certain nationality and thus subject to 
sovereign immunity, the recognition of such immunity is dependent upon the continued ownership 
of the vessel by the flag-State.141 As we have seen in relation to privately owned shipwrecks in the 
previous chapter, ownership is extinguished primarily through abandonment of the owner, in the 
case of State owned vessels by the flag-State. Determining when and if a State has abandoned a 
warship or a state owned vessel is more problematic, however, as there appears to be no 
conventional or customary international law governing the question, and State practice has so far 
been inconsistent.142 There are two possible theories regarding the abandonment by flag-States of 
their vessels. The first theory requires the flag-State to expressly abandon title, while the second 
provides that abandonment may be implied by the facts, for example the passage of time.143 
 
The theory that flag-States must expressly abandon title was advocated as the international practice 
by the United States, providing in a 1996 statement of US policy that: 
‘title to such vessels [warships or other state vessels] is lost only by capture or surrender 
during battle, by international agreement, or by an express act ofbandonment, gift, or sale 
by the sovereign in accordance with relevant principles of international law and the law of 
the flag state governing the abandonment of governmental property... Title to such vessels 
and aircraft is not lost by mere passage of time.’144 
However case law seems to be inconsistent in the application of both theories. The US 
Abandoned Shipwreck Act 1987 provides that although an intention of the flag-State to abandon is 
required for US vessels, it is not required for foreign vessels. Thi  has been reflected in the US 
courts where State Vessels of Spain and the United Kingdom found in USwaters were found to 
have been impliedly abandoned.145 Inconsistency has also been seen by US courts in relation to US 
state vessels where implied abandonment was found in the cases of the USS Texas and the USS 
Massachusetts146 while the courts applied the express abandonment theory in the case of the CSS 
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Alabama.147 
 More recently in the cases of La Galga148 and Juno149 the salvors, Sea Hunt Inc had sought a 
declaratory judgement that the vessels had been abandoned by Spain and therefore not subject to 
sovereign immunity but instead to the law of finds and salvage. Both Sea Hunt and Virginia both 
argued that implied abandonment was enough to satisfy the requirements of abandonment, the 
circuit court, like the district court, held that since Spain had ‘asserted an ownership claim to the 
shipwrecks, express abandonment is the governing standard.’150 The Court had relied on a variety of 
cases such as California v Deep Sea Research, Inc151 where the circuit court noted that the ‘meaning 
of “abandoned” under the Abandonment of Shipwreck Act conforms with the meaning u der 
admiralty law,’ which requires express abandonment whenever a previous owner comes forward to 
assert a claim. The Fourth Circuit in La Galga and Juno also referred to the decision in the Central 
America.152 where the court had held that although abandonment could be inferred in the case of a 
shipwreck; such an inference would not be sustained where a previous owner comes forward and 
asserts a propitiatory interest. Although the case concerned a privately owned shipwreck the court 
relied on this decision to assert that the appearance of Spain in claiming ownership required the 
application of the express abandonment theory.153 
 The express abandonment theory has been further strengthened, however, by its application 
in the more recent case of the Mercedes. In response to the claims that the ship was not subject to 
sovereign immunity the court applied the principle that ‘a sovereign vessel that appears to have 
been abandoned remains the property of the nation to which it belonged at the time of sinking 
unless that nation has taken formal action to abandon it or to transfer title to another party.’154 This 
decision confirmed the international law that sunken warships may be abandoned only by an 
‘express act of abandonment’. 
 
4(vi) – The justification and significance of US case law 
The case law that we have discussed above regarding sovereign immu ity has all been US case law. 
This is justified by the fact that cases of such nature involving the identification of allegedly State 
owned shipwrecks and sovereign immunity has not arisen in other jurisdictions. Moreover, an 
additional justification for using US cases, such as the Nu stra Senora de las Mercedes, is that as a 
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result of their high profile and importance they have had a significa t effect on maritime law in 
other jurisdictions. 
 Spain, for example, has often been the flag-State claiming sovereign immunity in the US. As 
a result of these cases, and in anticipation of future such cases, Spain has initiated the ‘Proyecto de 
Ley de Navegacion Maritima’ (‘Bill of Shipping’) which will drastically reform Spanish maritime 
law which is still based on the ‘Libro III del Codigo de Comercio de 1885’ (‘Book III of the 
Commercial Code of 1885’). Various reforms under the Bill of Shipping arise as a direct and 
necessary consequence of the recent case against Odyssey in th  Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes. 
The reforms have been said to be necessary to avoid the lack of coordinati n and effectiveness of 
regional administrations which has facilitated the destructive work to Spanish heritage by treasure 
hunters around the world and on their own shores.155Moreover, the reforms would provide Spain 
with a means to protect their State vessels beyond their territorial waters by providing them with 
sovereign immunity. The reforms also provide other States with the exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereign immunity over their vessels.156 A ‘buque’ (“ship”) for the purposes of sovereign 
immunity under the Bill of Shipping is defined as ‘todo vehiculo con estructura y capacidad para 
navegar por el mar y para transportar personas o cosas, que cuente con cubierta corrid  y de 
eslora igual o superior a 24 metros.’157 
Although England has been a historical maritime power the courts have not been faced with 
a complex case involving the sovereign immunity of a shipwreck. In most cases the United 
Kingdom has entered into contractual arrangements with salvors which have avoided the difficulties 
that arise in litigation. If such a case were however to arisein the courts of England and Wales the 
likelihood is that the outcome would be similar to that of the United States. In the United Kingdom 
sovereign immunity is governed by the State Immunity Act 1978 (the SIA). ection 10 of the SIA 
provides that a ship or cargo belonging to a State is not immune as respects an action i rem or an 
action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such a ship or cargo if at the time when 
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4(vii) – Concluding remarks on Sovereign Immunity 
In conclusion, there has been an element of inconsistency and lack of international case law in 
providing shipwrecks with sovereign immunity. Customary and international law provides flag-
States with exclusive jurisdiction and ownership over their vessels, however this principle is by no 
means clear. Questions still arise as to whether a 'wreck' is a ship' for the purposes of sovereign 
immunity; whether the identity and nationality of both shipwreck and its cargo makes it a State-
owned vessel; and, if it was a State-owned vessel, whether the shipwreck has been abandoned by 
the flag-State. In some situations the issues have been resolved through bilateral agreements 
between flag-States;159 however, in the majority of cases there is no consistency in the application 
of sovereign immunity. Determining ownership of a shipwreck is therefore of paramount 
importance to salvors seeking to assert ownership rights, or claima salvage award, as the finding 
that the owner is a flag-State could result in the claim failing on the basis of sovereign immunity. 
What we can conclude with an element of confidence is that there is a clear distinction drawn 
between a State-owned vessel (whether it be a warship or a ship carrying out non-commercial 
activities) and non-State-owned vessels (i.e. privately owned vessels or government vessels 
carrying out commercial activities). It follows, therefore, that if the shipwreck is found to be a State 
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CHAPTER 5 
CULTURAL HERITAGE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
As we have seen, shipwrecks have been prized by salvors and their flag-States for their economic 
value resulting in disputes involving a myriad of questions including what State has jurisdiction 
over the shipwreck; whether the law of salvage or the law of finds should be applied; whether the 
ship is protected by sovereign immunity and indeed the nationality of the shipwreck and its cargo. 
These disputes, however, do not take into account the importance of the shipwrecks in providing 
information about human history and cultural heritage. Few states around the world have felt 
compelled to protect historic shipwrecks and other underwater cultural heritage from vandalism and 
exploitation.160 Conventions such as the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention161 (UNCLOS) 
and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001162 (UCH 
Convention) and its set of annexed rules163 have strengthened the view that when dealing with 
shipwrecks, particularly historical shipwrecks, its economic value should be superseded by other 
values as underwater cultural heritage. The values that the UCH Convention seeks to protect, for 
example, are outlined in the preamble which provides for ‘the importance of underwater cultural 
heritage as an integral part of the cultural heritage of humanity d a particularly important element 
in the history of peoples, nations, and their relations with each otherconcerning their common 
heritage.’164 This chapter will look at the development of cultural heritage law protecting historical 
shipwrecks and how that affects the traditional application of salvage law and the law of finds, as 
well as the role of sovereign immunity. 
 
5(i) - United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) 
The regime under UNCLOS provides for the protection of underwater cultural heritage in two ways 
in accordance with two main provisions; Articles 149 and 303. 
 Article 303(1) provides for a general obligation of protection and cooperation which applies 
to all archaeological and historical objects, wherever they ar  located at sea providing that ‘States 
have a duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea and shall 
cooperate for this purpose.’ 
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As a result of this provision, States cannot knowingly destroy or allw the destruction of 
objects forming part of the underwater cultural heritage. Additionally, States cannot persistently 
disregard requests by another State to negotiate forms of cooperati n aiming at the protection of the 
underwater cultural heritage.165 
 Under Article 303(2), a different regime applies to archaeological and historical objects 
located within the 24-mile contiguous zone: 
‘In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying article 33 (i.e. 
the provision concerning the contiguous zone], presume that their removal from the sea-bed 
in the zone referred to in that article without its approval would result in an infringement 
within its territory or territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to in that article [i.e. 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations].’ 
 Although UNCLOS provides for the protection of underwater cultural heritage it has been 
heavily criticised as being unsatisfactory, insufficient and counterproductive in the protection of 
cultural heritage. The first criticism of Article 303(2) relat s to the fact that the powers coastal 
States have over the archaeological contiguous zone are irrelevant to the protection of cultural 
heritage (i.e. powers in relation to customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations). 
Secondly, the provision provides the coastal State with the power to prevent and sanction the 
‘removal from the sea bed’ of objects of an archaeological and historical nature. If this is interpreted 
literally it would mean that coastal States have no power against someone who 'destroys' the object 
rather than 'removing' it. These issues and complications have been said to arise as a result of 
UNCLOS wanting to avoid increasing coastal States rights beyond the territorial sea, a concept 
known as creeping jurisdiction. 
 Article 303(3) creates a further problem with regards to the protecti n of cultural heritage. 
Article 303(3) provides that ‘nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the law 
of salvage and other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with respect to cultural exchanges.’ 
This provision means that if there is a conflict between protecting underwater cultural heritage 
(Article 303(1)) on one side, and the law of salvage and other rules of admiralty, on the other, the 
latter would prevail (Article 303(3)). This provision, therefore, makes salvage law compatible with 
the protection of underwater cultural heritage. UNCLOS, however, fails to clarify the meaning of 
‘the law of salvage and other rules of admiralty.’ As we have seen in chapter II above, in many 
countries, such as England and South Africa, salvage law only applies salvage to attempts to save a 
ship or cargo from imminent marine peril and does not apply salvage of shipwrecks, which are not 
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considered to be in peril, but instead a total loss. Only a small number of common law jurisdictions, 
such as the US, have extended the application of the law of salvage to cover shipwrecks. Moreover, 
also discussed in chapter II, salvage law has been said to be inconsistent with the protection of the 
cultural heritage of historical shipwrecks. The extent to which UNCLOS affects the application of 
traditional maritime principles, such as salvage law, to shipwrecks is therefore unclear and requires 
clarification. 
 Article 149 UNCLOS deals with the underwater cultural heritage that is found on the seabed 
and ocean floor beyond the 200-mile limit of national jurisdiction (contine al shelf) by providing 
that: 
‘All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be preserved 
or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular regard being paid to the 
preferential rights of the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State 
of historical and archaeological origin.’ 
This provision gives preferential rights to the State of cultural o igin, the State of historical and 
archaeological origin and the State or country of origin, whereas there seems to be little or no rights 
given to private interests. Although Article 149 gives cultural heritage priority over private rights, it 
is very vague and does not set out clearly the content of such rights nor how the rights should be 
harmonised with the concept of ‘benefit of mankind as a whole’.166 
 
5(i)(a) - Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes Case 
We have discussed this case various times throughout this dissertation therefore it is unnecessary to 
recite the facts in great detail. As discussed, Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc. discovered the 
shipwreck of a Spanish frigate, the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes, which was sunk by a British 
fleet in 1804 in international waters off the coast of Cadiz, Spain. Odyssey took salvaged items to 
the US to have the wreck symbolically present so that it could be arrested, and Oydssey 
subsequently claimed either ownership or a salvage award for its services. The Court of Appeals 
rules that they did not have jurisdiction over the matter due to Spain's sovereign immunity as the 
flag-State of the vessel and ordered that Odyssey hand over the approximate 500 000 silver and 
gold coins to the Spanish government.  
 As a result of the US courts dismissing the claim due to sovereign immunity, the claims 
made by Peru as the country of cultural origin were not examined. Peru had requested that the 
District Court address the competing interests of both countries before deciding on matters of 
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sovereign immunity. If the court had done so, the proceedings may have been decided in a different 
way. The dispute would not have been one between salvors and a sovereign State, but instead it 
would have been one between two sovereign States asserting preferential rights over recovered 
underwater cultural heritage.167 This case seems like exactly the situation that Article 149 UNCLOS 
envisages, providing that ‘particular regard be paid to the preferential rights of the State or country 
of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archaeological origin.’ 
 Looking at the facts, Peru is arguably more entitled from a cultural heritage perspective than 
Spain. The ship carried gold coins that originated in the present territory of Peru arguably making 
Peru closer to being the State of origin, the State of cultural origin and the State of historical and 
archaeological origin, than Spain. Moreover, the cargo never even r ached the shores of Spain. One 
of the issues, however, is that at the time of sinking, Peru was part of the Spanish Empire and was 
not a sovereign State. This raises the interesting question as t  whether Spain should really be able 
to assert ownership over property that was only Spanish property in the first place through the 
exercise of colonialism. It may also be argued that the interests of a sovereign State should not 
outweigh the importance of the protection of underwater cultural heritage. 
 The application of Article 149 UNCLOS was, however, challenged on tw grounds, namely, 
that, Peru is not a party to UNCLOS, and, secondly, that the salvaged items were found in the EEZ 
of Portugal (which is not covered by Article 149 UNCLOS). This was de pite an affidavit by John 
Norton Moore,168 presented on behalf of Peru, explaining why the District Court should apply 
Article 149 to the case. It was argued that ‘Article 149 has a significance that goes beyond the legal 
zoning provided by UNCLOS, since it is its only provision specifying the preferential rights of 
States to underwater cultural heritage.’169 During the negotiations for UNCLOS, the United States 
had wanted to include in the General Provisions section the following: 
‘... all States have a duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found 
in the marine environment. Particular regard shall be given to the Stat  of origin, or the State 
of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archaeological origin of any objects of an 
archaeological and historical nature found in the marine environment in the case of sale or 
any other disposal, resulting in the removal of such objects from a State which has 
possession of such objects.’170 
Moore recalled this to argue that Article 149 should determine the pref rential rights of sovereign 
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states to underwater cultural heritage beyond the zoning limitations. 
 Although it is clear that Peru would have better chances than Spai of being identified as the 
State of cultural origin, the US court dismissed Peru's claim on the basis that Peru is not a party to 
UNCLOS. The case was simply decided on the basis of sovereign immunity based on a report and 
recommendation that explained why the issue of sovereign immunity was relevant in the case. 
 The fact is that it is clear that the cargo form part of cultural and historical origin of the 
region of Peru and due to the fact that Peru had not ratified UNCLOS and the fact that the cargo 
was located within the EEZ of Portugal, Article 149 was not applied.  
This case highlights the problems with UNCLOS and its ability to protect underwater 
cultural heritage, particularly in relation to claims made by flag-States. In addition to the problems 
addressed it is difficult to say with certainty the extent that UNCLOS affects the balance of power 
between the different interested parties to a shipwreck.  Article 303(4) UNCLOS, however, provides 
that the provisions are ‘without prejudice to other international agreements and rules of 
international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeologica  and historical nature’, 
which allows States to pass more detailed conventions on the protection of underwater cultural 
heritage.  
 
5(ii) - The UCH Convention 
The UCH Convention was drafted to ‘prevent the destruction of submerged a chaeological sites, to 
regulate cooperation among States... to harmonise international research st ndards... and the 
protection of submerged heritage, which includes for instance ancient shipwrecks and sunken ruins, 
with the protection already accorded to cultural heritage on land.’171 The UCH Convention therefore 
applies to ‘all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological character 
which have been partially or totally under water, periodically or c ntinuously, for at least 100 
years’.172 The UCH Convention would therefore apply to a shipwreck that has been partially or 
totally underwater, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years (hereafter shall be referred to 
as ‘an historic shipwreck’). 
The UCH Convention has been described as a ‘reasonable defence against the results of the 
contradictory and counterproductive regime of the UNCLOS.’173 One of the ways that the UCH 
Convention has achieved this reputation is by removing the possibility of commercial exploitation 
of heritage for individual profit and with it the undesirable effects of the law of salvage and finds 
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for the heritage found on the continental shelf. 
 
5(ii)(a) - Law of Salvage and Law of Finds under UCH Convention 
During negotiations most countries agreed that the law of salvage and finds should not apply to 
underwater cultural heritage. There were, however, a minority of States that were not prepared to 
accept an absolute abolition of the principles. Article 4 of the UCH Convention therefore provides a 
compromise: 
‘Any activity relating to underwater cultural heritage to which this Convention applies shall 
not be subject to the law of salvage or law of finds, unless it: (a) is uthorised by the 
competent authorities, and (b) is in full conformity with this Convention, and (c) ensures 
that any recovery of the underwater cultural heritage achieves its maximum protection.’ 
In addition to the above, Rule 2 of the Annex to the UCH Convention provides that: 
‘... the commercial exploitation of underwater cultural heritage for trade or speculation or its 
irretrievable dispersal is fundamentally incompatible with the protection and proper 
management of underwater cultural heritage. Underwater cultural heritage shall not be 
traded, sold, bought or bartered as commercial goods.’ 
The UCH Convention therefore limits the application of the law of salvage and finds, and where it 
does allow these principles to be applied; it prevents all the undesirabl  effects of their application 
by not allowing commercial exploitation. The position of the salvor is therefore greatly weakened. 
 
5(ii)(b) - Jurisdiction under the UCH Convention 
The UCH Convention also deals with the issue of jurisdiction. Again, a compromise was made to 
deal with the concerns of creeping jurisdiction and the balance embodied in the UNCLOS between 
the rights and obligations of coastal States and other States.174 The UCH Convention deals with the 
issue by providing a three-step procedural mechanism involving reporting, consulting and urgent 
measures.  
If the activity or discovery is located in the EEZ or on the contine tal shelf of another State 
Party, Article 9(1)(b) provides that the national or the master of the vessel must report such a 
discovery or activity to them and to all other State Parties. 
 Article 9(5) deals with consultations and provides that the coastal State is bound to consult 
all States Parties which have declared their interest in be g consulted on how to ensure the 
effective protection of the underwater cultural heritage in question. I  continues to provide that a 
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State Party may make such a declaration of interest ‘based on a verifiable link, especially a cultural, 
historical or archaeological link, to the underwater cultural heritage concerned.’ 
Article 10(4) deals with urgent measures providing State Parties to take measures in 
accordance with international law to prevent immediate danger to underwater cultural heritage. 
The UCH Convention does not therefore extend State jurisdiction but simply imposes 
obligations on interested parties, such as coastal States, flag-States and salvors, to report and consult 
with each other, promoting collaboration. Additionally, State Parties ar  given the power to take 
practicable measures to prevent immediate danger to underwater cultural heritage. Involving States 
in the discovery and coordination of the salvage operations of shipwrecks will perhaps avoid the 
situation of States being excluded and may promote cases being settled outside of court.  
 
5(ii)(c) - Sovereign Immunity under UCH Convention 
The UCH Convention also amends States ability to rely on the international principle of sovereign 
immunity. State sovereign rights are not safeguarded as fundamental rights under the UCH 
Convention and are instead only preserved as a means to ensuring effective preservation of the 
underwater cultural heritage by requiring that State parties comply as far as is reasonable and 
practicable with the Convention.175 
 Therefore, although sovereign immunity still exists for jurisdictional purposes, flag-States 
are only able to exercise their rights for the purpose of preserving underwater cultural heritage. In 
practice, however, this may not affect the outcome of cases involv g Flag-States claiming 
sovereign immunity as these claims are usually based on underwater cultural heritage arguments. 
 
5(iii) - The Present Situation 
The UCH Convention entered into force in 2009176 and as of 2011 it had forty-one parties. Although 
the UCH Convention has made significant changes to the treatment of historical shipwrecks, as a 
result of its youth we have yet to see any examples of its applic tion. Moreover, there are various 
examples showing that the Convention has not yet been appreciated by a sufficiently great number 
of States.177 
 For example, in the recent case of Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes, little reference to the 
cultural heritage or any legislation concerning the protection of cultural objects was made, and 
instead the decision was made to reject jurisdiction based on Spain's right to sovereign immunity. 
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 Similarly, in England, the idea of preserving underwater cultural heritage has also not been 
appreciated as evidenced by an agreement with Odyssey Maritime Exploration in order to rescue 
the Sussex which was an ancient sunken vessel loaded with gold and silver coins located near 
Gibraltar.178 England was criticised for entering into such an agreement as it did not take into 
account existing domestic and international provisions relating to the preservation of the cultural 
heritage and was largely based on the commercial exploitation of the cargo.179 In relation to the 
UCH Convention, it is clear that England did not base the agreement on it at all as it did not 
appreciate the preference under the for in situ preservation; it did not appreciate the fact that 
commercial exploitation is completely banned by Rule 2 of the Annex to the UCH Convention; and, 
the agreement did not take into account any interests of private or public ersons other than those of 
England. 
 In addition to States being suspicious and uncomfortable with the UCH Convention, the 
United Nations General Assembly until recently has also been reluctant to mention the UCH 
Convention in its resolutions. Only recently with the Resolution on Oceans and Law of the Sea 
adopted in 2011 the General Assembly was more open to the application of he UCH Convention. 
The General Assembly called upon ‘States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to 
that [UCH] Convention’, noting ‘in particular the rules annexed to that Convention, which address 
the relationship between salvage law and scientific principles of management, conservation and 
protection of underwater cultural heritage among Parties, their nationals a d vessels flying their 
flag’. 180 
 
5(iv) -  Conclusive remarks 
UNCLOS and the UCH Convention have therefore increased the importance of considerations of 
underwater cultural heritage over private and sovereign rights over historical shipwrecks. These 
Conventions have also created a distinction between a shipwreck under 100 years old and a 
shipwreck that is over 100 years old, providing only the latter with protection as underwater cultural 
heritage. These conventions have made progress in creating internatonal uniformity in relation to 
treatment of shipwrecks; however, such progress cannot be fully appreciated until courts have had 
the opportunity to apply them. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND SOLUTION  
 
As this dissertation highlights, the determination of rights to any shipwreck is extremely fact 
specific. The obstacles that an exploration company, or indeed anyone claiming to have rights, must 
overcome in order to exercise rights over a shipwreck are by no means easy or indeed clear. In fact, 
the discrepancies and uncertainties created by the different laws and their application are such, that 
any company considering a commercial venture to profit or even recover osts from a shipwreck 
must as part of its business plan to evaluate risk and reward, first ca ry out a lengthy and 
complicated legal analysis of the rights that it may acquire, the manner in which it can enforce such 
rights and also consider possible rights of others which compete with or defeat its own rights. As 
this dissertation shows, such a legal analysis involves many factors. 
 An exploration company finding a shipwreck in international waters mu t first deal with the 
issue of jurisdiction as international waters are not subject to any one State's jurisdiction and 
therefore any State control over such wrecks is limited. Generally, by bringing part of the shipwreck 
within the physical jurisdiction of the court will give the court the constructive possession required 
to be able to seize jurisdiction on the matter.   
 Even when jurisdiction is established, the court is then required to determine which law 
should be applied in relation to rights over the shipwreck. As we have seen there are numerous 
views on the appropriate rules that should be applied, namely whether the law of salvage and the 
law of finds should be applied. The key question in relation to these two doctrines of maritime law 
is whether the original owner is found to have abandoned the shipwreck. This is something which 
will be very difficult for any exploration company to investigate in order to be able to reach a view 
and in any event, it is possible that the court entertaining the matt r, may well come to a different 
conclusion either on the facts or in the light of further evidence. Generally, if the shipwreck has 
been abandoned the law of finds shall be applied resulting in the finder becoming the owner. 
Whereas if the shipwreck has not been abandoned, the law of salvage may be applied resulting in 
the salvor being awarded for his efforts.  
 The question is complicated even further by the involvement of a national or State 
governments who may claim sovereign rights over shipwrecks and their cargo. Generally, 
customary and international law recognises that warships and State-owned vessels are entitled to 
immunity. Whether a shipwreck is subject to sovereign immunity also depends on a variety of 
factors. There is debate as to whether a 'shipwreck' is a 'ship' for the purposes of sovereign 
immunity. Secondly, the identity and nationality of the ship and its cargo must be determined to 
create the link between the ship and the flag-State to form the legal basis for justifying a claim by 
54 | P a g e 
 
the State over such a ship. In addition to both these issues, the question of whether the shipwreck 
was abandoned must be decided. If abandonment is established the Flag-State it will no longer be 
protected by sovereign immunity. But generally, courts have been reluctant to find abandonment of 
warships or State-owned vessels unless there is very clear evidence of express abandonment.  
 The above principles of law applied to shipwreck do not take into account the importance of 
its potential underwater cultural heritage. Certain national regimes and international conventions, 
such as UNCLOS and the UCH Convention have strengthened the principle that when dealing with 
historical shipwrecks, their economic value should be superseded by other valu s, such as 
underwater cultural heritage. Although the UCH Convention recognises the priority of the interest 
of humankind in preserving underwater cultural heritage as a common good, the law of the sea is 
still anchored to the traditional sharing of powers and rights between sovereign States and private 
owners.181 
 Despite the inconsistency in approaches and lack of appreciation for unde water cultural 
heritage in relation to historical shipwrecks, it seems clear that generally it is universally agreed that 
historical shipwrecks form part of the underwater cultural heritage, which cannot be considered as 
ordinary properties or resources, which must be preserved for the purpose of the preservation of 
history and traditions of humankind as a whole.182 If one is to agree that historical shipwrecks are 
special in nature, then it follows that applying the law of salvage, the law of finds and recognising 
the absolute rights of flag-States' over sunken vessels through sovereign immunity, is inconsistent 
with the promotion of underwater cultural heritage on the scales of priority considerations. The law 
must take into account other States' claims, such as the State of cultural origin, and must also take 
into account the private claims of legitimate heirs if it is possible to demonstrate a link between 
private persons and the legitimate owners of the objects found on the historic shipwrecks. 
Moreover, although these private rights should be protected, the public access to these properties 
should not be denied as these historical objects are important as part of cul ural heritage and the 
evolution of human kind.183 
 The status quo is clearly inadequate for all interested parties providing no clarity, no 
certainty, no consistency and no international uniformity as to how cases involving shipwrecks will 
be dealt with. Any solution to clarify the determination of rights to  shipwrecks must be a balancing 
act that take into account the different interests of all the interested parties and provide a clear set of 
rules which properly and fairly deal with these interests givin  due priority to those interests from a 
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private sentimental, economic, political, cultural and legal perspective. In theory, the solution to the 
issue is twofold; (1) the agreement of pre-salvage contracts between salvors and interested States; 
and (2) the ratification of an international convention dealing with private rights, sovereign rights of 
flag-States and underwater cultural heritage. 
 The first practical solution to solve the issues relating to rights over shipwrecks and 
historical shipwrecks would be to encourage salvors to enter into pre-salvage contractual 
relationships with flag-States. This has already been common practice making the existing law 
subject to any such contractual arrangement that may be entered into by the parties. This would 
avoid many of the problems most often encountered. Under this approach the salvors would 
approach the flag-State and agree a salvage award prior to the commencement of any salvage 
operations and the incurring of costs. This would provide the salvor with certainty in the form of a 
legally binding contract enforceable in the courts. Having a pre-salvage contractual relationship 
with the flag-State would also avoid the issue of jurisdiction as the contract would contain a 
jurisdiction clause and a submission to the law of a jurisdiction. As matters presently stand, each 
shipwreck scenario is extremely fact specific and entering into pre-salvage contractual relationships 
would also enable the parties to tailor the contract to the particul r shipwreck balancing risk and 
reward, providing incentives and achieving the objectives of the parties in an agreed and orderly 
manner that permits the work to be undertaken in the most efficient manner.  
 Although, a pre-salvage contractual relationship has obvious advantages as a solution to 
come of the obstacles, it also has its complications. Approaching a flag-State, or indeed any 
interested State, regarding a salvage operation of its State own d vessel or a vessel within their 
territorial waters is likely to be a long drawn out process. For example, when Odyssey entered into 
an agreement with the United Kingdom to salvage the Sussex which involved entering into parts of 
Spanish territorial waters the amount of correspondence and authorisations required was excessive 
spanning over years.184 In addition to the significant passing of time, a treasure hunting company 
cannot be certain that the State would be willing to contract. For example, Odyssey, in discovering 
the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes attempted to contract with the Spanish Government. Having 
approached the Spanish Government regarding the possibility of entering a contractual relationship 
regarding the salvage of the shipwreck, Spain rejected the proposal stating that Odyssey was not 
authorised to salvage the Spanish shipwreck, Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes.185 Any process 
requiring the reaching of an agreement with a Government is likely to take time and much expense, 
whereas the exigencies of modern business and commercial life, require a simpler and quicker 
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solution that allows the business to be undertaken.. This is also complicated by the fact that 
Government change periodically with elections. It is also ad hoc, in the sense that depending on the 
facts and location of the vessel, a salvor will need to deal with different Governments of different 
states on each occasion. 
 Moreover, even when salvors have entered into agreements with flag-States for the salvage 
of their vessels both parties have been criticised for failing to take account of underwater cultural 
heritage considerations or respecting the interests of private or public persons. This was the 
situation in 2002 when the United Kingdom entered into an agreement with Odyssey for the salvage 
of the Sussex.186 
 For these reasons, a preferred solution, would be to create an internat onal convention that 
provides a clear regime that with a balanced approach also takes into account the interests of all 
interested parties, the salvors on the one part as the company investing the money, undertaking ht 
eowkr and taking the risks and, the flag-States, the States of cultural origin, and the legitimate 
owners or heirs to the legitimate owners on the other who will also benefit from the salvors efforts. 
The key to a successful international convention would be to provide a sufficient reasonable 
incentive for each interested party.  
 The salvors, such as companies likes Odyssey, are realistically the only type of entities with 
the funds, knowledge, expertise and, most importantly, the technology to be able to salve 
shipwrecks in international waters. As we have seen from expeditions such as the Titanic, Nuestra 
Senora de las Mercedes, Juno and La Galga and the Lusitania salvage operations are often very 
expensive. Salvors will therefore only be willing to carry out such salvage operations if they are 
guaranteed adequate reward for their efforts. Although it has been argued that the law of salvage has 
undesirable effects on wrecks, such as promoting careless and hasty salvage efforts by salvors, the 
reality is that without treasure-hunting ventures the majority of the shipwrecks that have been 
salved would not have been in the first place. Allowing salvage awards for the salvage of 
shipwrecks would therefore be a very important part of any international convention. It is also likely 
that in view of the difficulties experienced by salvors which substantially increase their risk and 
costs, salvors would support an international conventions which brings clarity and certainty even if 
this were at the expense of having to give up part of the larger share of the wreck that sometimes 
they are presently awarded in cases when they are successful. 
 It is understandable that the flag-States, conversely, would be unwilling to allow salvors to 
explore and exploit shipwrecks that may contain valuable cargo or sensitive information to which 
the flag-State would feel entitled. The difficulties with attrc ing States to such conventions has 
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been evidenced recently by the UCH Convention where States have been reluctant to give up their 
sovereign rights over their State-owned vessels and are unwilling to allow for increased 
jurisdictional control by coastal States over international waters. In eality, in most cases, flag-States 
do not give salvage high levels or priority and do not have the expertise, knowledge or capital 
available to carry out salvage operations and are reliant on commercial operations of salvors, such 
as Odyssey, to carry out the operations on their behalf. Without the salvors efforts, flag-States 
would not even be in the position to be able to claim sovereign immunity in the first place. The 
solution also to provide States with an incentive to signing up to an inter ational convention would 
include certainty, involvement and/or control in the salvage operation, a say in the outcome coupled 
with a financial incentive. Perhaps this solution could involve the requirment that once the 
nationality or identity of the shipwreck is determined, the flag-State be given exclusive jurisdiction 
over the matter, subject to applying the set of rules contained in the international convention. This 
would provide the flag-State with the control and involvement in the salvage operation of their 
shipwreck, provide the flag-State with exclusive jurisdiction, allow delicate, secret or sensitive 
matters to be addressed in an orderly and proper forum and, also ensure that the interests of other 
parties are taken into account through the mandatory application of the international convention.  
 The interests of those claiming cultural heritage have involved fag-States, States of cultural 
origin and heirs to the legitimate owners of shipwrecks and cargoes. As discussed, UNCLOS and 
the UCH Convention have increased the importance of considerations of underwater cultural 
heritage over private and sovereign rights over historical shipwrecks. The full effects of the UCH 
Convention, however, are yet to be seen due to the fact that it only came into force in the year 2009. 
A good starting point for the proposed convention would be to provide a clear definition of a wreck, 
clearly distinguishing between a shipwreck and an historical shipwreck by reference to age, so that 
only historical shipwrecks are accorded with the protection as underwater cultural heritage. Then, 
similarly to the UCH Convention, provide exceptions allowing salvors to be awarded for their 
efforts ensuring that underwater cultural heritage is protected. In addition, compromise ensuring the 
protection of underwater cultural heritage, while providing financial incentives to salvors, would be 
to impose conditions on salvors to set up exhibitions or museums and enablethem to make profit. 
This would provide the underwater cultural heritage with the protectin it requires, allow the public 
to appreciate such heritage while concurrently providing income for the salvors without any the loss 
of such heritage to commercial private sales.  
 An international convention would therefore be a welcome solution providing an element of 
clarity and fairness to the situation of shipwrecks found in internaio l waters. However, like all 
international conventions, it is very difficult to satisfy all interested parties needs. The development 
of such an international treaty would ultimately be subject to the political will of a l States involved. 
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 With advances in underwater technology and the ability to venture into deeper and more 
challenging waters, it can be expected that commercial exploitation of shipwrecks will become 
much more frequent. Moreover, with a greater sense of public interest and appreciation for the 
protection of cultural heritage, the legal disputes for rights in sh pwreck will also become more 
frequent. For this reason, it is very important to establish a reasonable and clear set of applicable 
rules to govern the activity of wider application to bring certainty, clarity and purpose to an 
important activity in a manner that address and provides for the interest of all parties involved 
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